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Abstract 
Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party and Its Mainland China Policy 
Hung-chin Wei 
Taiwan has successfully changed its political system from dictatorship into a 
democracy since the end of 1980s. Some people do not like 'Taiwan's democracy' -
some candidates get elected by bribery in election, parliamentary fighting., bu t the 
majority of the Taiwanese people really enjoy their freedom in their homeland. They 
do know, at least, they have the right to oppose the government, no one would be 
shot by the national military force in a demonstration. 
The political systems are totally different between Taiwan and Mainland China, one is 
democracy, another is communism. Even the majority of the Taiwanese people are 
Chinese in ethnic origin, but their life experience are different over the past 50 years, 
it is difficult for any side to persuade the other side which one is better. 
Some Chinese Taiwanese people believe that they can have a better life, i f their 
homeland—Taiwan can be really independent in the international community. 
Taiwan's political opposition built Taiwan's first opposition party— Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) 13 years ago, and with the dream of establishing a new 
independent country on Taiwan. 
The establishment of the DPP is the result of the political opposition movement in 
Taiwan. Most of the members of the DPP have a strong Taiwanese identity, which is 
very different from the ruling KMT in Taiwan and the ruling CCP in China. The DPP 
gains more influence in Taiwan, the uncertainty across the Taiwan Straits increase at 
the same time. The DPP waited and saw between being the ruling party and 
establishing an independent country on Taiwan, finally it chose to complete the 
political aim of replacing the position of the KMT at present. 
The purpose of the study is to assess the DPP's policy-making in its Mainland China 
I 
policy. I try to give a full picture of the policy-making process in the party. The most 
important factor in the formulation of the mainland China policy is the relationship 
between the factions within the DPP, therefore, I adopt the historical and document 
review approach on doing this study, and describe how the interaction between the 
factions worked and how they made the decisions on the policies? 
I found that the DPP wil l insist on its 'one Taiwan, one China' policy before 
becoming the ruling party in Taiwan. However, the DPP's insistence on the 'one 
China, one Taiwan' policy could bring conflicts across the Taiwan Straits and 
obstruct the possibility of replacing the ruling KMT's position. Hence the DPP tried 
to explain again the party's Taiwan independence platform, and to 'purify' the party's 
ideology in order to achieve its present political aim. 
Because the cross-Straits relationship is still developing, the DPP's mainland policy 
would be affected by various factors across the Taiwan Straits. There is no final text 
of the DPP's mainland China policy at present. Therefore, I predict the future 
development of its China policy could tend in two ways. Firstly, i f the cross-Straits 
exchanges increase, and Beijing reduces its hostility, the DPP's stand of 'one Taiwan, 
one China' wi l l become more flexible, and it would keep on developing a more 
perfect China policy. Secondly, i f the cross-Straits exchanges decrease, and Beijing 
increases the force of threatening to Taipei, the DPP's stand of 'one Taiwan, one 
China' policy wil l be more radical, even though it would not turn its back on the 
business affairs. 
At the end of this work, I suggest the DPP rethink its insistence on a Taiwanese 
independence position, this could not break Taiwan's isolation in international 
community, but could endanger Taiwan's security. As the factional fight has reduced 
the force of the DPP, to condense the powers of the party would be an important issue 
for the DPP. 
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Introduction 
On 28 September 1986, 138 Tangwai (1) personalities assembled in the partly 
government-owned Grand Hotel in Taipei and established the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP), and the government, although declaring this move 'illegal', did not take 
any action. 
With this event a new stage, characterised by fully-fledged development of competitive 
political life, began in Taiwan. (2) 
In fact, in the process of the democratic transformation of Taiwan from authoritarian 
regime to democratic regime in the mid-1980s, (3) the barriers to such development in 
Taiwan were gradually dismantled. 
The foundation of the DPP is the result of the political opposition movement since the 
1950s, and also the system of one dominant party was challenged for the first time in 
Taiwan's political history. It put pressure on the ruling KMT, pushing the old 
authoritarian regime to speed up its political reform in Taiwan. (4) Just a little bit earlier 
than the DPP's establishment, on the date of 15th July, 1986, the ROC government 
announced lifting the Emergency Decree, which had been implemented for 37 years 
from 20 t h May, 1949. 
Later, on 6 t h December of the same year, National Assembly and Legislative elections 
took place in Taiwan. 
Although, the DPP was 'illegal' de jure (The ban on the formation of new political 
parties wi l l l i f t later.), people in Taiwan finally could enjoy their rights, which were 
originally guaranteed by the constitution from that time on. (5) On 21 s t December 1991, 
the first direct election for all delegates of the National Assembly by Taiwanese people 
was held. (6) After the mass retirement of senior Legislators, the election for the Second 
Legislative Yuan was held in 1992. Since then, the Legislative Yuan has been the most 
important venue for political wrestling. (7) The Taiwan Provincial governor and mayors 
for Taipei and Kaohsiung cities have been elected by the people directly from the end of 
1994. Political and social developments of Taiwan have moved in the direction of a 
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pluralistic society. (8) Furthermore, the first-ever popular election for the president in 
the history of Taiwan was held on 23 March 1996, further advancing the idea of popular 
sovereignty in Taiwan. 
At the same time, the relationship between the two sides of Taiwan Straits started 
changing. After a separation of 40 years, the late President Chiang Ching-kuo decided 
to allow citizens to visit their relatives in Mainland China. This policy was officially 
implemented on 2 n d November 1987. The lifting of the ban on visit to the mainland 
promoted a wave of interest in, and contact with, Mainland China which was known in 
Taiwan as the 'mainland craze'. Over a period of 12 years, non-political exchanges 
between Taiwan and the mainland in the economic and cultural spheres have brought 
about the closest relations since 100 years ago when Taiwan was separated from the 
mainland. (9) Taipei's policy of opening towards the mainland has been described by 
Peter R. Moody, Jr. as 'a shrewd double-edged political manoeuvre'. It not only catered 
to Beijing's long term needs, but also, through the 'mainland craze', put pressure on the 
DPP and its policy of advocating of Taiwanese independence. Although, the issue of 
unification versus independence was not solved by the policy of opening, it was the first 
time Taiwan really faced the mainland problem. (10) However, after Chiang Ching-kuo 
died on 13 th January 1988, vice-president Lee Teng-hui completed the remainder of 
Chiang's term in accordance with the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution. Taipei's 
Mainland policy started changing. 
The 'mainland craze' quick spread to the economic field. The mainland's vast market 
and low costs have a powerful attraction for investment by Taiwanese enterprises. The 
ROC government has expressed concern about the growing tide of investment in the 
Chinese mainland, because the investments entail enormous risk. The investment 
climate there has deteriorated due to inflation, wage rises, insufficient legal guarantees, 
and political instability. These factors are detrimental to the development of Taiwan's 
economy and Taiwan's relationship with Mainland China. In 1990, rumours emerged 
that the government in Taiwan would take steps to dampen the 'mainland craze'. (11) 
Later, on 10th January 1994, Premier Lien Chan launched a Southward Investment 
Strategy, which encourages capital investment in Southern Asia. Then two trips by 
President Lee Teng-hui and Premier Lien to Southeast Asian countries in 1994 led to the 
signing of bilateral trade packs with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
(12) Faced with changes in the international situation and the political and economic 
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situations of Mainland China and Taiwan, the ROC government finally introduced a 
new guideline for its policy towards Mainland China, the so-called 'Operating Great 
Taiwan, Rebuild New China' policy. It stressed that the ROC government wished to 
adopt a practical and realistic stance to cross-Straits relations. (13) Later, at the end of 
1996, a consensus was reached between the Kuomintang (KMT; Nationalist party), DPP 
and New Party (NP) that 'The ROC has been a sovereign state since 1912. Following 
the establishment of the Chinese communist regime in 1949, the two sides of the 
Taiwan Straits became two equal entities.' (14) It is very clear that the ROC government 
seeks equal status to the People Republic of China (PRC) government. 
1-1. National identity in Taiwan 
In the process of Taiwan's political development, the problem of the national identity 
within Taiwan's society began to emerge. According to Wei Sun-hung, ' In the process 
of Taiwan democratisation, discussion of the issue of national identity had been 
prohibited, but now finally have 'legal space' within Taiwan's society. 'Taiwanese 
independence' and 'Chinese reunification' have equal status in Taiwan.' (15) With 
democratisation in Taiwan, the KMT's one-party-dominant system was broken. The 
ruling KMT could not insist on its 'one China' policy under which it claimed to be the 
sole legal government of China. Advocating 'one China, two political entities' resulted 
in the issue of 'unification or independence' becoming a matter of concern in Taiwanese 
society. Conflicts on over this issue arose between the advocates of unification and the 
advocates of independence. 
There are four main ethnic groups in Taiwan - Fukiense, Hakka, Mainlander, and 
Aboriginal people. They have different mother tongues, but except the aboriginal people, 
the ancestors of Fukiense, Hakka, and Mainlander were all came from Mainland China 
at different time. 
Chinese settlement in Taiwan dates back as far as the 12th century A.D, but large-scale 
immigration did not begin until the 17th century during the period of Dutch 
administration. While the Dutch were colonising Taiwan, China was going through a 
period of strife. The struggle between the Chinese affecting many people. Consequently, 
thousands of people, especially from the coastal provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung, 
began to migrate across the Taiwan Straits to Taiwan. They found the soil of Taiwan 
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much richer than that of the mainland, and corps grew twice as abundantly. During the 
twenty years from 1624 to 1644, about 100,000 Chinese people immigrated to Taiwan. 
(16) They were the ancestors of the Fukiense, Hakka ethnic groups in Taiwan. Normally, 
in Taiwan, these two groups of people are called the 'Taiwanese' whose political 
attitudes are usually close to keep distance from the Communist China, even some of 
them might not support to build an independent country in Taiwan, but the majority at 
least tend maintain the present situation of Taiwan. 
Another greater Chinese immigration took place in 1949, when the beaten KMT moved 
to Taiwan . In 1946, Taiwan's population was 6.02 million. The population further 
increased to 7.39 million in 1949, due to the influx of migrants from the Chinese 
mainland. (17) This part of new immigrants are called the 'mainlanders' whose political 
attitudes are usually close to unite with the Chinese mainland, most of them support the 
Republic of China, but not the People's Republic of China. As for some younger 
generation, their attitude has changed a lot, which is very different from their parents 
and the older generation. 
Political conflict about the issues of unification with China or building an independent 
country is a serious problem in Taiwan. Different ethnic groups usually have different 
political attitudes, but most of the time, this is just a stereotype. This problem is usually 
related to the ethnic problem. About 80% of the 22 million population of Taiwan is a 
'Taiwanese' group. The aboriginal people are under 365,000 people. Therefore, the 
allocation of the political resource is not so fair. Political conflicts take place through 
the issues of 'unification' or 'independence' which make the problem of national 
identity more complex. 
In this study, for avoiding confusion, I adopt 'Taiwanese' to address the citizens of the 
Republic of China on Taiwan; and adopt 'Chinese' to address the citizens of the 
People's Republic of China. 
1-2. The K M T in Taiwan 
Although Taiwan experienced impressive economic growth under the KMT, it saw 
negligible political change until the mid-1980s. Under President Chiang Kai-shek, the 
political aim of the ROC was to recover Mainland China, and the ROC government 
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structure was one for the whole China. Any democratic political demands were met 
with jail sentences of more than 10 years or even capital punishment. 
From 1948 to 1950, the beaten KMT brought its 2 million troops to Taiwan. At that time, 
Taiwan had a population of 6 million. Taiwan's effective political power has thus far 
resided with mainlander KMT leaders. This has caused conflicts between the native 
Taiwanese and the mainlanders (people of mainland Chinese birth or descent), although 
the KMT made a major effort to integrate Taiwanese into the party. However, even by 
the late 1970s the party elite remained dominated by mainlanders. The Taiwan Garrison 
Command also kept a tight grip on society and the military retained an important role 
against political dissidents. 
To some Taiwanese, the constitutional system appeared to be merely a convenient 
attempt to legitimise and disguise a mainlander dictatorship. This was emphasised by 
mainlander control of the army and the intelligence agencies. 
Due to the fact that mainland-born Chinese have controlled the political institutions in 
Taiwan, and for historical reasons such as the '228 Incident' of 1947 (18), some native 
Taiwanese and some of the ruling mainlanders harboured mutual suspicion over the 
ROC's policy towards the mainland. The native Taiwanese wondered i f Taiwan would 
be sold out i f the rulers abandoned their present stubborn stance and made a deal with 
the Communist (19) motivated by nostalgia and the consciousness of China as a great 
nation. Antonio Chiang, publisher of the well-known magazine, The Journalist, in 
Taipei, pointed out that Taiwanese strongly disliked the People's Republic of China's 
(PRC) proposals because they only appeal to the KMT. They talked party to party, and 
regarded unification as only a 'family affair' between the KMT and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). (20) Furthermore, some of the Taiwanese, who comprise more 
than 80% of Taiwan's 21 million population, consider that the ROC government 'is not 
truly representative of their wishes and interests, especially in its undue emphasis on 
Taiwan's unification, which they see as a ploy by the KMT to monopolise political 
power _. Nor are they enthusiastic about China's unification, which they see as an 
impossible mission under KMT auspices, and a catastrophe i f brought about by the 
Communists'. (21) 
The Taiwanese people trusts neither the KMT nor the CCP. As the main political 
opposition party in Taiwan, the DPP's view about the future of Taiwan is quite different 
from the KMT's and the CCP's 'one China' policy. In the DPP's view, the nature of the 
'Taiwan problem' is that: 'Taiwan is composed of 21 million residents. It has a totally 
independent international character, but it has not had the respect from the international 
society and the international status it deserves.' (22) The DPP not only assails the 
CCP's insistence that 'Taiwan is a part of China' and rejects its 'one country, two 
systems' policy (23) as 'imperialist tyranny', but also attacks the KMT's assertion that 
'There is no Taiwan problem, but only a China problem' as 'flying in the face of the 
facts', and the KMT's notion of 'one China, two political entities' as 'deceiving itself 
and others as well'. (24) 
The DPP's view on the 'Taiwan problem' is that Taiwan is an independent country. 
Therefore it proposes 'one China, one Taiwan' as the framework of its Mainland China 
policy. The DPP's view is that the Nanking ROC government was overthrown by the 
CCP in 1949. Since the establishment of the PRC, the PRC has been the sole legal 
Chinese sovereign government. (25) Furthermore, the PRC took over China's seat at the 
United Nations (UN) in 1971. That means the 'China problem' has been resolved. 
According to international law, the PRC succeeds the ROC and becomes the sole legal 
government of China. (26) But the DPP does not accept that the PRC has sovereignty 
over Taiwan. The DPP considers that there is no relevant document that has defined the 
international status of Taiwan, and the PRC also has not ruled Taiwan. Principles of 
international law, such as 'effective jurisdiction', and democratic principle, such as 
'self-determination' and the notion that 'a modern government's sovereignty derives 
from popular approval' have become the paradigm of the definition of national 
sovereignty. Therefore, legitimate sovereignty over Taiwan is vested in neither the PRC 
nor to the ROC. (27) 
As described above, the DPP considers that no 'China problem' exists across the 
Taiwan Straits. According to the principle of self-determination, the DPP also stresses 
that 'both China problems and Taiwanese problems exist; but Taiwan's problems should 
be solved by Taiwan, and China's by China.' (28) Therefore, the DPP proclaims that the 
two sides of the Taiwan Straits should define the cross-Straits relations within the 
framework of'Taiwan is Taiwan, China is China' (One China, one Taiwan). 
It unilaterally considers that a 'one China, one Taiwan' policy would help both sides to 
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build 'a framework of mutual, equal, and stable relations'. (29) To sum up, the DPP's 
position is that it considers 'one China, one Taiwan' the only and best principle on 
which to base cross-Straits relations. 
1-3. The research method 
The cross-Straits relationship is still developing, the DPP's mainland policy would be 
affected by various factors across the Taiwan Straits. There is still no final text of the 
DPP's mainland China policy at present. The future development of its China policy 
could tend in two ways. Firstly, i f the cross-Straits exchanges increase, and Beijing 
reduces its hostility, the DPP's stand of 'one Taiwan, one China' will become more 
flexible, and it would keep on developing a more perfect China policy. Secondly, i f the 
cross-Straits exchanges decrease, and Beijing increases the force of threatening to 
Taipei, the DPP's stand of 'one Taiwan, one China' policy will be more radical, even 
though it would not turn its back on the business affairs. 
The approach I adopt is a historical and documentary review. Since the DPP is the 
continuation of the Tangwai political opposition movement, in order to give a full 
picture of Taiwan's democratisation, I consider a time period from the 1950s, when the 
KMT government moved to Taiwan, to the present. After the Chinese Nationalist 
government move to Taiwan in 1949, the main themes of politics inside Taiwan were 
closely related to the cross-Straits situation. I divide the political history across the 
Taiwan Straits into the following four stages: 
1). The period of intermittent fighting in the Taiwan Straits (1950 - 1963): According to 
the KMT's definition, the ROC on Taiwan is a continuation of the regime which ruled 
China before 1949. The ROC was forced by the CCP advances to relocate to the 
island Taiwan, located in the Western Pacific off the eastern coast of Asia. For the 
KMT and the CCP, the civil war from 1945 to 1949 has never finished. Hence the 
KMT's political aim was to recover the mainland' in the early days. (30) At the same 
time, the CCP's political aim to Taiwan was to 'wash Taiwan in blood' and 'liberate 
Taiwan by force'. (31) The democracy was suspended under the 'Temporary 
Provision Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion' (1948). In this period 
of time, it was almost impossible for people in Taiwan to express political views in 
opposition to the government. For example, a group of intellectuals and politicians of 
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mainland origins together with politicians of Taiwanese descent prepared to establish 
a new political opposition party, the Chinese Democratic Party, in 1960. However, 
after leading members of this initiative were arrested in September 1960 on charges of 
not reporting Communist agents, the whole project was abandoned. (32) 
2) . The cross-Straits cold war period (1964 - 1971): During this period, the two sides 
across the Taiwan Straits shifted their struggle from actual fighting to the arenas of 
diplomacy and economy in the international community. Each side tried hard to 
blockade the other side's avenues to the outside world. A good example is the contest 
for membership and the right to represent China in the UN during the 1950s and 
1960s. It was a war with bullets between the sides. (33) Within Taiwan, the KMT 
maintained its system of authoritarian rule. But the content and the framework of the 
'one China, one Taiwan' policy began to take shape among opposition groups. In 
September 1964, Peng Ming-min, the former head of the Politics Department of 
Taiwan University, wrote the 'Taiwanese People's Self-Help Movement Declaration'. 
This declaration can be seen as the first document which proclaims 'one China, one 
Taiwan' in Taiwan. Peng was arrested and sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment. But 
President Chiang Kai-shek granted him an amnesty. Later he escaped, and went into 
exile for over 20 years till 1991. 
3) . The period of detente between the Taiwan Straits (1971 - 1986): In October 1971, 
the PRC took over China's seat at the UN, and forced the ROC out. In 1970s, the 
main theme of Beijing's Taiwan policy was 'peaceful reunification of Taiwan'. The 
proposal of 'one country, two systems' was put forward during this period. Taipei also 
quietly modified its declared policy toward Beijing from 'counterattack and 
recovering the mainland', first, in the 1960 and 1970s, to 'using thirty percent military 
force and seventy percent political force' to recover the mainland, and finally in 1980s 
to 'reunification of China under the Three Principles of People'. In Taiwan, the 
Taiwan Christian Presbyterian Church put forward its 'Statement and Suggestion of 
National Affairs' on 29th December 1971. In this statement it stressed that 'human 
rights are given by God, and the people have the right to decide their future'. And it 
also opposed 'Taiwan's unification with China' or 'Direct negotiation between Taipei 
and Beijing'. (34) That statement was the first in Taiwan to express something close 
to demand for self-determination for the island. (35) Later, in August 1977, the 
Presbyterian Church put forward another statement: a 'Declaration on Human Rights'. 
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It proclaimed that 'Taiwan is a new and independent nation', (36) and tried to prove 
anthropological and cultural differences between Taiwan and Mainland China. 
4). The period of 'two political entities' (since 1986): At the end of the 1980s, the KMT 
launched political reform in Taiwan. Opposition figures formed the DPP in 1986. On 
the one hand, President Lee Teng-hui's Taiwanisation policy has encouraged the 
Taiwanese people to pursue a 'better' and more 'reasonable' international status for 
Taiwan. Calls for Taiwan's independence have become louder. The ROC's pragmatic 
diplomacy also challenges the PRC's 'one China' policy. Beijing has never renounced 
the right to use military force to achieve the aim of unification. On the other hand, in 
Mainland China, Beijing also started its policy of economic reform. For its economic 
development, the PRC has to keep the mainland open to the outside world's capital 
and technology. Economic contacts began between Taiwan and the mainland. Taiwan, 
like the Western countries, can provide capital and other wherewithal to the mainland. 
Some scholars have argued that as long as the PRC concentrates on economic 
construction, the likelihood of it resorting to military means to resolve the China issue 
in the short term is reduced because the PRC 'need a peaceful environment' to 
proceed with its modernisation program. (37) But, as Beijing's launching of military 
exercises to threaten Taiwan's presidential election in 1996 indicates, the possibility 
of the cross-Straits military conflicts has not disappeared. In this period, many events 
have occurred. For example, in 1991 the DPP formulated its 'Taiwan independence 
platform', which advocated establishing an independent 'Republic of Taiwan'. 
Speaking about Taiwanese independence ceased to be a taboo. In the same year, 
Taipei sent a non-official delegation to the PRC to meet Beijing leaders, the first of its 
kind since 1949. Later, Taipei set up The Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), and 
Beijing established the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), 
to function as intermediary organisations. The two authorised intermediary 
organisations held two rounds of talks in 1993 and 1995. (38) These events show that 
the cross-Straits situation has become more complex. 
This brief review of the political situation across the Taiwan Straits above provides the 
background to the formation of Taiwan's political opposition movement. Because 
Taiwan's political opposition movements have traditionally been based on alliances of 
local political forces, co-operation and struggle between the factions of the DPP have 
been the main factor affecting the formulation of party policy. Introducing the history of 
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the transformation of the factions from the Tangwai era to the DPP will also assist in a 
more clear understanding of the DPP. The sources of materials I use in the research 
include: 1) official DPP documents such as the DPP Party Platform, records of meetings 
such as Central Standing Committee, National Congress, and the other important 
conferences. Some KMT documents are also used. 2) Newspaper and magazine reports 
from Taiwan, China, and overseas. Press reports can give a clear picture of important 
events relevant to the research, and can reflect the public opinion at the time the events 
took place. 3) Interviews with party leaders. These reveal information not found in press 
reports. 4) Information on election results. These present the real political situation in 
Taiwan, and enable the policies of the parties to be examined. 5) Public opinion surveys, 
which can reflect the views of Taiwanese society. 6) Other research on the DPP. 
1-4. Purpose of this research 
As outlined above, the nature of the cross-Straits relations began to change in the 1980s. 
The relationship across the Taiwan Straits has changed from one characterised by 
hostility to one characterised by rapprochement. The means to resolve this issue have 
also changed from declared intentions to use force to actual peaceful means, and the 
approach to solving this issue involves not only the notion of unification but also that of 
independence, as the question of whether Taiwan should unify with the mainland or 
declare its independence has become a topic of intense debate within the ROC. 
As the most important opposition party, the DPP could take the place of the KMT as the 
ruling party in Taiwan i f it wins the support of the majority of Taiwan's residents of in 
national elections in this democratic country. However, Taiwan faces a very special 
situation in that its international status is unclear. The ruling KMT advocates a 'one 
country, two political entities' policy, insisting upon seeking an equal status to China; 
Beijing advocates a 'one country, two systems' policy, insisting that Taiwan is a part of 
the PRC, The DPP advocates a 'one China, one Taiwan' policy, insisting that Taiwan's 
sovereignty is independent. 
For the DPP, how to build a balance within the triangle relations between the three 
policies of 'one country, two political entities', 'one country, two systems', and 'one 
China, one Taiwan' will be the most important issue on its road to becoming the ruling 
party in Taiwan. Therefore the main aim of the research is to analyse the formulation of 
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the DPP's Mainland China policy, and to attempt to predict the possible direction of its 
policy of the future. 
In fact, the DPP has started to 'soften' its theme of Taiwanese independence. The 
Taiwanese independence principle does make it difficult for the DPP to take the place of 
the KMT. People in Taiwan worry that Taiwan's independence would provoke a 
Chinese military attack. Indeed, the CCP's leaders have stressed more than once that 
they will not renounce the use of force to achieve unification. (39) According to 
speeches by CCP leaders and other related materials published since 1970s, Beijing has 
set five circumstances under which force would be used: (40) 
1) An indefinite refusal by Taiwan to enter into negotiations; 
2) An attempt by the Soviet Union or other countries to interfere in Taiwan's affairs and 
the resolution of the China issue; 
3) An attempt by Taipei to develop nuclear weapons; 
4) Proclamation of Taiwan as an independent nation; 
5) Revolution and chaos occurring within Taiwan. 
Many of the DPP's leaders have said that Taiwan does not need to announce the 
establishment of a new independent country, because it is already an independent 
country. (41) The DPP's adjustment of the status of Taiwan's independence in its 
platform has caused splits within the party. For example, radical advocators of Taiwan's 
independence formed the Taiwan Independence Party (TAJP) in October 1996. But it 
would helpful to the DPP to introduce a more flexible Mainland China policy to the 
electorate. 
1-5. Arrangement of chapters 
Introduction: The main purpose of this part is to provide background to the political 
situation in Taiwan, as the overall basis for the research. I argue that in order to improve 
its prospects of becoming the ruling party in Taiwan, the DPP will adjust its stance on 
Taiwanese independence. Its Mainland China policy will become more flexible to match 
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cross-Straits political reality. 
Chapter 1: 'The Rise of the DPP'. I introduce the foundation of the DPP and a brief 
history of the political opposition movement. The main purpose of this chapter is to 
show the DPP's advocacy of independence for Taiwan is its defining feature. But the 
stance on independence also limits its growth. 
Chapter 2: 'Factions within the DPP'. I introduce the factions in the party, their history, 
and how they work within the party. The DPP is composed of people of many different 
political ideologies, the struggles within the party have limited itself to face up to 
external political circumstance. With regard to domestic politics, the various factions are 
able to unite against the KMT. But toward the PRC, they favour various different 
strategies. The Formosa Faction tends to support negotiating with the PRC, but the New 
Tide Faction tends to insist on officially establishing an independent state in Taiwan. 
Therefore, the relationship between the factions within the DPP is a very important 
factor affecting both the formulation of its Mainland China policy and its future. 
Chapter3: 'The Formulation of the DPP's Mainland China Policy', I introduce the 
history of the formulation of the DPP's Mainland China policy, and describe the 
background to its policy-making process. 
Chapter 4: 'The DPP's China Policy Symposium in 1998'. The DPP's 1998 China 
policy symposium was the first occasion on which the party tried to propose an official 
Mainland China policy. It also was the first time that the different factions of the party 
debated and challenge the other's views. It was a milestone in the history of the DPP. 
Even after the symposium, the DPP still has not presented an official mainland China 
policy. Nonetheless, the symposium was helpful in making the different ideas within the 
factions. 
Chapter 5: 'Conclusion'. I review the previous chapters and make the conclusion that 
the DPP will 'soften' its demand for Taiwan's independence, because the main aim of 
the party is to gain election to government. Insistence on pursuing independence for 
Taiwan would be an obstacle to the DPP gaining office, and would damage the future 
development of Taiwan. 
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Chapter 1. The Rise of the Democratic Progressive Party 
1-1. Introduction 
The DPP is the continuation of Tangwai political opposition movement. The Tangwai 
movement was tightly related to the history of Taiwan's democratisation. In the view of 
some Tangwai politicians, the KMT regime was a colonial government like the 
Japanese ruling Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. (1) Since the KMT insisted itself was the 
representative of China, therefore, to strive for the political power was to strive against 
the colonial KMT and its Chinese consciousness. In other words, the DPP's opposition 
to the KMT which inherits Tangwai opposition movement, is based on the anti-Chinese 
consciousness. The anti-Chinese consciousness is from the bad impression of the 
KMT's ruling Taiwan in the early years. For example, the 228 Incident that took place 
in 1947 had given the Taiwanese older generation an unforgettable scar. From then on, 
the 228 Incident has become an important factor in Taiwanese Independence Movement. 
(2) 
Because DPP inherited the legacy of anti-Chinese consciousness from Tangwai, 
naturally it later developed the Taiwanese independence consciousness and turned into a 
'Taiwanese independence party' when the political environment had been opened 
totally. But when the independence consciousness has become holy and inviolable, it is 
difficult for the DPP to face Mainland China and to make a suitable Mainland China 
policy. The arguments about independence stratagem have become serious within the 
party. It has been more important than before to build a balance between realising the 
dream of 'Republic of Taiwan' and gaining the support from majority of Taiwanese 
people who take serious care of Taiwan's national security in the shadow of China's 
threat. The DPP's independence status should be 'soften' to fit the political reality, and 
in fact, it has been changed gradually already. 
1-2. Political situation in Taiwan 
1-2-1. The beginning of KMT's ruling in Taiwan 
When World War I I ended in 1945, KMT regime on Mainland China took control of 
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Taiwan from the Japanese, who had ruled the island for 50 years. Four years later, in 
1949, the defeated KMT was forced to retreat to Taiwan. 
Because of the misgovernment of the ruling KMT, the economic and political problems 
in Taiwan were serious then. In the evening of February 27, 1947, an old women had 
been injured while protesting against the expropriation of untaxed cigarettes she was 
selling Taipei. Later the angry fire had soon spread throughout the island. On March 9, 
the Nationalist army landed at Keelung. By March, many local leaders had been 
arrested. And thousands of people died in the incident. 228 Incident took place in 1947, 
it was just two years after Taiwan's handover to the KMT. It disappointed native 
Taiwanese very much. They were ruled by the Japanese colonial government for fifty 
years, from 1895 to 1945. Taiwanese used to fantasise about going back to the 
motherland China. But the dream was broken. The KMT and the Chinese government 
disappointed them. Native Taiwanese elite searched their mind for an answer of the 
future of Taiwan and made a conclusion that Taiwanese independence would be the 
only political line for Taiwan itself. Three groups, which were affiliated to the Taiwan 
Independence Movement, were formed in reaction to the 228 Incident. The suppression 
of the 1947 demonstrations proved to them the dictatorial nature of the KMT regime in 
Taiwan, a rule that was characterised by the oppression of one group of people, the 
Taiwanese, by another, the mainlanders. (3) From that time on, Taiwanese 
independence has become the mainstream of the political opposition movement in 
Taiwan. DPP's former chairman Hsu Hsin-liang also said in his book The Rising People, 
'Taiwan has had a very special history. When the old colonies celebrated with jubilance 
for being independent from their colonial governments. Taiwan was punished by its 
colonial government Japan which had governed it for fifty years. It was deprived of the 
right of self-determination, to be returned to its so-called 'motherland', to have another 
uncivilised ruling. The 228 Incident and the following era of 'White Terror' had made 
lots of wrong souls all around Taipei, and made people of the island to be cripples in 
polities'. (4) 
1-2-2. Political opposition movement and political participation in the early years 
According to Ger Yeong-kuang's analysis, there are four stages of Taiwan's democratic 
development: establishment, growth, take-off, and consolidation. (5) In fact, in the 
opposition's view, the first stage which Ger called 'democratic establishment' from 
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1949 to 1977 was the 'dark ages' in the history of the opposition movement. But KMT 
opened a door of elections for political participation. Therefore, the opposition started 
uniting together, and forming the quasi-party opposition group to challenge the ruling 
KMT's authority. 
The first stage Ger called 'Establishing a Foundation for Democracy' and lasted from 
1949 to 1977. The KMT used authoritarianism to promote modernisation and maintain 
its one-party ruling system. It implemented the Emergency Decree in 1949, placing 
various restrictions and limitations on the people's rights, which were originally 
guaranteed by the Constitution. The rights that were temporarily frozen included the 
freedom of speech, freedom of publication, right of assembly, and freedom of 
association. But the popular elections started being held in this stage. In July 1950, the 
government held the first election for county and city councillors. In August and 
October of that year, the first elections for county magistrates and provincial 
municipality mayors, chiefs of rural and urban townships, mayors of county 
municipalities, and chief administrators of districts also took place. The first election for 
members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly were held in April 1957, and in December 
1969, supplementary elections were held in the Taiwan area to elect 15 delegates to the 
National Assembly, 11 members to Control Yuan. Finally, in order to improve and 
expand the channels for political participation, the supplementary elections for members 
of Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly were held in December 1972. (6) 
As the Emergency Decree restricted the formation of new political parties, the ruling 
KMT maintained its majority under a 'one-dominant-party system'. The Tangwai 
candidates who sometimes challenged KMT candidates in elections occasionally 
emerged victorious. For example, the important opposition member who was charged 
for 8 years imprisonment for 'Kaohsiung Incident' in 1979, (7) the second chairman of 
the DPP Huang Hsin-chieh, was elected as a Legislator in 1969. Political election has 
been an important channel for the opposition to participate in politics in Taiwan from 
then. The opposition people have had a stable support from the Taiwanese. (See Table 1 
and Table 2.) But participating elections also brought a long-term argument about the 
views on the political line of the opposition movement. It was the beginning of the 
formation of the opposition movement. (See Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.) 
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The KMT sometimes was challenged by the opposition in elections in the early years. 
But most of the parliamentary seats need not be re-elected regularly, so the KMT could 
maintain its position of one-dominant-party rule. The turning point was in 1977, when a 
mass protest in Chungli, a small city in north Taiwan, against an irregularity of vote 
counting in KMT touched off a serious clash between angry voters and the police. (8) A 
district police station was burned and a number of casualties were reported. The incident 
signalled a growing popular disenchantment with the authorities' conduct in electoral 
politics. After that, the opposition forces, mainly consisting of indigenous elements, 
pursued more confrontational tactics and attracted an activist layer fundamentally 
different in age and political outlook to that of their predecessors. In the local elections 
that year, opposition candidates won one-quarter of the magistrates' and mayors' posts, 
as well as 30% of seats in the provincial assembly. A new era of a nation-wide 
opposition movement was drawing. (9) 
After the Chungli Incident, although the Emergency Decree was still in effect, 
restrictions on freedom of speech had been greatly eased. Political magazines began to 
spring up everywhere. The political competitions during this period focused on the 
KMT and Tangwai. On 1 s t June, 1979, Tangwai people established the Taiwan Tangwai 
People's Representatives Coalition Office, and the following day they formed the 
Central Parliamentarians Candidates League. On 24th August, 1979, they set up 
Formosa Magazine to serve as a common mouthpiece; soon, the magazine was being 
touted as the 'magazine for Taiwan's democratic movement'. (10) The 60 funding 
members came from a wide range of opposition factions and began setting up 
islandwide branch offices for Formosa Magazine. All of these actions indicated the 
formation of a new party. Finally, opposition figures formally announced the 
establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party at the Grand Hotel on 28th September, 
1986, marking the end of the second stage of Taiwan's democratic development. 
1-2-3. Tangwai's political views 
In the year of 1978, Tangwai people organised Taiwan Tangwai People's Campaign 
Committee, the first time they presented the common political statements. From then, in 
every election, Tangwai people normally organised the campaign committees, and 
presented the political statements to the public. (11) 
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In the era of Tangwai, the opposition faction's political statements focused on problems 
of political reform to ask for liberalisation and democratisation. (12) Tangwai's political 
statements on political opposition movements could be divided into three parts. The first 
was to ask for liberalisation and democratisation including 'implement the constitution 
completely', 'resuming the people's basic rights of civil liberties, freedom of assembly, 
association, speech, and publication', 'stop the political persecution, release the political 
prisoners', ' lift the Emergency Decree', 'release the ban of reformation of new political 
parties', 're-elect all members of the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly', 're-
elect all the posts of provincial governor and city mayors'. The second one was 
Taiwanisation and the Taiwanese independence appeal. For example, they announced 
'oppose the discrimination to native place and native language', 'the future of Taiwan 
should be decided by the people of Taiwan'. In 1985 county magistrates and city mayor 
elections, they presented the Taiwanese independence political slogan which advocated 
for self-determination by the Taiwanese people - 'New political party, New situation, 
saving Taiwan by self-determination'. The third one was a general appeal to public 
policies. For example, they asked to 'launch the National Health Insurance and out-of 
work Insurance', 'launch the Labour Standards Law', 'prevent the public accident, and 
maintain the good quality of the environment'. (13) 
In fact, either to instigate liberalisation, democratisation, or to approach the target of 
self-determination, Tangwai people's purpose was to challenge the KMT's authority, 
and the consciousness of the greater Chinese nationalism. Therefore, 'We can say, 
Tangwai's political purpose was to overthrow the bad system of KMT regime, and to 
challenge its greater Chinese consciousness. Therefore, the relationship between the 
opposition people and the KMT regime during the period of Tangwai was not only an 
antagonistic one, but also a zero-sum game. The antagonistic relationship between the 
opposition faction and KMT had not changed after the formation of the DPP'. (14) 
1-2-4. The DPP and the Tangwai 
Most of the initiators of DPP were the political elite in the Tangwai era, we can say, 'the 
formation of DPP was the legacy of the Tangwai political opposition movement'. (15) 
And not only the political elite but also the main targets of the political movement were 
included in the DPP's political statements. 
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Firstly, to overthrow the KMT and the greater Chinese consciousness was also to be the 
purpose of DPP. The concrete stand was to be presented on its party platform and the 
common political statements of the 1986 general elections. On the stand of liberalisation 
and democratisation, DPP kept on asking KMT 'to lift the Emergency Decree', 'to 
abolish the Temporary Additional Articles of the Constitution and laws and regulations 
which are contrary to the Constitution, to implement the spirit of the Constitution', 'to 
re-elect all the members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, directly 
elected president', and 'to implement the spirit of the Constitution on self-governance 
for local affairs, directly elected provincial governor and city mayors'. On the problems 
of national status and Taiwan's future, it was still to put 'self-determination as the base 
of its inference in the chapter of Basic Programme on its party platform. It stressed that, 
'The future of Taiwan should be determined by all the residents of Taiwan with the 
mode of freedom, to act on Taiwanese own, widespread fairness and equality. Any 
government or governments have no right to determine Taiwan's political status'. In the 
common political statements of the 1986 general elections, DPP also stated, 'The future 
of Taiwan should be determined by all the residents of Taiwan with the mode of 
widespread, fairness and equality' as their first article of the common political 
statements. (16) 
Secondly, on the stratagem of DPP, the formation of DPP had not given a great impact 
to the KMT regime. The transformation of KMT and Taiwan's politics having come 
true were due to the DPP's and the opposition elite's contention. Therefore, DPP's 
stratagem was to contend with the KMT at the beginning of its formation. It raised the 
'parliamentary approach' and 'mass demonstration approach' to challenge the KMT's 
authoritarianism. 
Thirdly, on the organisation of the DPP, there were two styles— 'parliamentary 
approach' and '"mass" or "street" demonstrations'. But the competitions between 
different ideologies were very intense. (17) The impact between the Formosa Faction 
which preferred the 'parliamentary approach' and the New Tide Faction which 
preferred the 'mass demonstration approach' has gone to a peak at DPP's Third 
National Congress in 1988. 
1-3. Political context of the formulation of the DPP 
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Between 1984 and 1986, people started to realise that the authoritarian one-dominant-
party of the KMT on Taiwan was un-sustainable. International and domestic factors 
were contributing to a build-up of pressure for reforming both inside and outside the 
party. The KMT was faced with the choice of harsher repression or some sort of 
liberalisation. To the surprise of many, in view of parentage and background, Chiang 
Ching-kuo chose the path of reform. (18) 
Internationally, Washington built the formal diplomatic relation with Beijing in 1979. 
Deng Xiaoping, the CCP's late leader who died in 1997, visited Washington and was 
feted as Time magazine's 'man of the year'. China's image had improved beyond 
recognition, so that its coaxing words to compatriots on Taiwan seemed winningly 
reasonable to many. KMT, meanwhile, was locked into its 40-year-old, and now 
clearly quite forlorn, claim to sovereignty over China. However, the KMT realised that 
Taiwan still needed the US support for its continued survival. But US-backed 
dictatorships around the world seemed to be crumbling: the Shah of Iran and 
Nicaragua's Somosa in 1979; Morcos in the Philippines in 1986; Chun Doo-hwan in 
South Korea a year later. The lesson of backing would not be unstinting i f the regime 
failed to meet popular demands for political participation. (19) 
At home, KMT was rocked by a series of scandals. Not only did the financial quagmire 
of the Cathay scandal (20) in 1985 threaten to besmirch the reputation of many of the 
Party's most senior figures, but there had been an even worse revelation regarding the 
country's intelligence services. In October 1984, Henry Liu, a Chinese American who 
wrote a critical biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, was murdered in California. It 
transpired that a top intelligence official conspired with Taiwanese gangsters 'to teach 
him a lesson'. Given the KMT's arrogation to itself of powers beyond not just its own 
laws, but those of its most important friend, reform seemed a necessity. 
Meanwhile, Tangwai opposition people in parliament were maturing as a result of 
several years of open activity in the Legislative Yuan. I f KMT were to keep the 
electoral majority needed to mitigate the manifest unfairness of its huge numerical 
preponderance in the Legislature, it would have to clean up its act. The rising living 
standards on the island, and the exposure to, in particular, American democratic values, 
made the younger generation less willing to put up with the restrictions of martial law. 
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Nor did the muzzling of the opposition by occasional arrests, tight media controls and 
law-suits helped the KMT's image as a party of the people. (21) 
Mid-year 1986 the KMT seemed to heading for an election defeat in November. 
However, past problems and crises were not as important as they appeared, or were 
handled deftly. In any case, an election loss was averted. (22) The nation's most serious 
problem then was its growing foreign exchange position, resultant of a huge trade 
surplus. Some observers commenting about the problem said that it was one that most 
developing nations wish they had. (23) 
The ruling KMT also appeared to be taking the coming elections seriously and showed 
its willingness to adjust to new political realities in order to help its candidates to 
electoral victory. In March of 1986, KMT held its third plenary session of the party's 
12th Central Standing Committee. The new appointments mirrored progressive changes 
in the direction of Taiwanisation, democratisation, and a younger leadership of the party. 
Some even speculated that the older, less flexible and more authoritarian-minded 
leaders of the party no longer held the balance of power in top party decision making 
bodies. (24) 
A few months later, President Chiang Ching-kuo (also Chairman of the KMT) ordered 
the formation of a twelve-member committee to study the status of martial law and the 
ban on the formation of new parties. Studying martial law and the ban of new parties 
was to find a way to get rid of both and to figure out how the system could best be 
pushed ahead on the road to further democratisation without evoking political chaos or 
instability. (25) 
On the subject of legalising new parties, Tangwai leaders proposed that they be allowed 
to have permanent offices countrywide in the form of Tangwai Research Association 
for Public Policy. Even though Tangwai Research Association for Public Policy was 
not a 'party', but it could co-ordinate party activities during periods when elections 
were not pending. Furthermore, it did have a platform, such as 'party' funds, and a 
united campaign. In May of 1986, the government, upon the recommendation and 
support of President Chiang, decided the affirmative action. 
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Later, Tangwai officials, scholars and others held a meeting to discuss the proposals to 
abolish martial law and to allow the formation of new political parties. The issue was 
not whether to carry out these decisions, that was viewed as inevitable. Nor were there 
any really intractable issues between the two sides relative to implementing the 
proposal. 
Because Tangwai people were already in a most respectable political party, so the issue 
of formation of new parties was not so hot. (26) But older KMT officials opposed 
giving it legal status. The main reason was that i f the opposition people form their 
political party, there might be a danger of party competition. Allowing Tangwai people 
to operate as a party, but without legal status, seemed to be very cautious. (27) 
Moreover, some Tangwai politicians were not enthusiastic about the offer of legal status, 
since the Tangwai was in large part a protest party and winning legal status. Some 
perceived that it would be a liability rather than an asset in the coming election 
campaign. The Tangwai lack of a base of support in the sense parties in Western 
countries could identify a region, social class, or other segment of the population that 
supported the party and rendered it various help. Thus the protest vote was viewed as 
crucial. (28) 
In early June of 1986, four Tangwai opposition politicians, including the former Taipei 
City mayor and which then was Taipei City councillor Chen Shui-bian, Taipei City 
councillor Lin Cheng-chieh, Huang Tien-fu, and Lee I-yang were jailed for libelling a 
university professor in an article in Neo-Formosa Magazine. Opposition leaders viewed 
the court action as an attempt to prevent their candidates from running the December 
election. They charged that the decision was influenced by the KMT. 
In August of 1986, Tangwai People's Representatives' Association for the Study of 
Public Policy organised a rally in Taipei, attracting 50,000 participants and speculators. 
The gathering was attended by the executive director of the US National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs. That gave the impression that the US supported 
Tangwai People's Representatives' Association for the Study of Public Policy and an 
end to the ban on political parties. In fact, some perceived this as a sign of US pressure 
on the government to 'open up' the coming election. (29) 
24 
Later in early September, 1986, Lin Cheng-chieh appeared at the steps of the 
Presidential Office Building, and in front of a large crowd, smashed a black clock (in 
Chinese language, the clock means a homonym of end or final), signifying that he had 
the attitude with the government. This became the cause of several days of 
demonstrations in Taipei and other large cities in Taiwan that attracted large numbers of 
people. (30) 
On 9 t h September, protesters in Taipei formed a large street march - the first led by the 
opposition since the 'Kaohsiung Incident' in 1979. The march attracted even more 
participants and spectators and seemed to inject both unity and enthusiasm into the 
opposition movement. It also appeared to enhance public support for Tangwai 
politicians. Meanwhile, the government's contention that the court decisions against 
Tangwai notables were not influenced by any other branch of the government or the 
ruling KMT, though true, was not very convincing. (31) This encouraged the opposition 
people to scale new heights. On 28* September of 1986 - without further consultations 
with the KMT, the government, or Chiang Ching-kuo's committee - 138 Tangwai 
politicians, after a meeting at the Grand Hotel in Taipei, announced that they had 
decided to form the Democratic Progressive Party. The announcement was provocative 
inasmuch as it was still illegal to form a new party. Yet it seemed apparent to almost 
everyone that the ban on new parties would be lifted and that the DPP's 'crime' was one 
of simply acting prematurely - which was not very serious. It was also obvious that the 
Tangwai made this move (rather than continuing discussions with the committee) in 
order to avoid the perception that it was a creation of the KMT or was born out of 
Tangwai-KMT co-operation. (32) 
After the formation of DPP, KMT started its transformation actively. Chiang Ching-kuo 
declared that the Emergency Decree to be lifted and that the ban of the new political 
parties' formation to be released. (33) 
On 8 t h November, 1986, Yu Ching, an important leader of the DPP, told Japanese 
reporters that the DPP had a membership of 2,500 and expected to grow to 100,000 in 
less than a year. (34) He declared the DPP's objective was to 'break KMT one-party 
monopoly rule and build a welfare society after the Western European model.' He also 
said the DPP standed for 'self-determination' and wanted Taiwan to be readmitted into 
the UN. 
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On 10th November, the DPP announced its party organisation and leadership. Oddly, the 
DPP was structured after Leninist organisational principles. Opposition politicians of 
Tangwai movement had long pointed out the KMT 'hypocrisy' because of structuring 
the ruling party after these 'communist' tenets of party organisation. Apparently the 
opposition people were not impressed with the organisational structures of the Western 
political parties. They had studied various party structures (including those in the US) 
but ostensibly considered unity and party discipline too important to adopt the 
organisational structures of any of them. (35) 
Chiang Peng-chien, a relatively little-known member of the Legislative Yuan, was 
elected first term chairman of the DPP in what appeared to be a close and divisive vote. 
Yu Ching and several others were in contention. Observers said the decision was a 
compromise and that the DPP's most well-known and most charismatic leader (meaning 
Yu) was not picked to head the DPP because of factional in-fighting. Many called 
Chiang's appointment a mistake. A serious party spilt seemed in the offing. (36) 
Because those involved realised that party unity was a sine qua non to compete 
successfully in the December election, a formal spilt was avoided. And party unity, at 
least on the surface, was retained. 
President Chiang announced that the DPP was a 'legal' party. But three conditions must 
be met: agree to abide by the Constitution, renounce communism, and defy supporting 
independence. Three conditions did not seem onerous. The opposition has long 
supported the Constitution. It had criticised the KMT for not upholding it. Few Tangwai 
politicians had ever to support communism. But the DPP had been critical of the 
Taiwan Independence Movement activities in the US and Japan and eschewed direct 
contacts with the Movement in either place. (37) 
The DPP, however, refused to accept the three conditions. Because the new party did 
not want to give the impression that it was colluding, or even cooperating, with the 
KMT. The new party sought to make difference between itself and the KMT. The DPP 
openly challenged the KMT's policy of 'recovering' the mainland instead of calling for 
separation from the People's Republic of China. Its party charter even contained a 
'plank' which stated that the future of Taiwan should be 'decided by the residents of 
Taiwan'. 
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In any event, the lines were being drawn between the ruling KMT and the opposition 
DPP on several important issues. Polarisation was not so serious, however, as to make 
the election process unworkable. Most wanted the system to work. Moreover it was 
clear the DPP was going to participate in the election as a party, even though legal 
status was yet to be granted. Blocking its participation would hurt Taiwan's political 
development and send the wrong signals domestically and internationally. (38) 
Finally, in the 1986 December election, the ruling KMT won 59 of 73 seats in the 
Legislative Yuan and 68 of 157 in the National Assembly. The opposition alliance, 
which was for the first time to use the new title of the DPP, captured 12 seats in the 
Legislative Yuan and 11 in the National Assembly. 
The new party continued to challenge the KMT and pushed it towards democratisation. 
The Emergency Decree was lifted on 15th July 1987. Then in November 1987 the KMT 
declared that Taiwanese people would be allowed to visit relatives in Mainland China, 
and in January 1988 that the registration of new newspapers would be accepted. The 
political policy was gradually liberalising its policies. But the Senior Parliamentarians 
were still in the Parliaments. The regime was taken by the KMT. Therefore, the 
democratisation of Taiwan had not come true before the total renewal of the central 
parliamentary bodies in 1992. (See Table 3.) 
1-4. The rise of Taiwanese identity 
Indeed, the rise of the DPP has accelerated the rise of Taiwanese identity. But the 
KMT's policy of Taiwanisation is also a very important factor of the rising Taiwanese 
identity. Especially, Lee Teng-hui's efforts on pushing the Taiwanisation policy do 
open a new era in Taiwan's history. 
In 1984, President Chiang chose a reformist vice-president, Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese 
native, who was not seen at the time as a serious candidate for the succession. He was a 
popular academic and technocrat. But people thought that the successor would have to 
be a mainlander. When Chiang Ching-kuo died in January 1988, Lee Teng-hui took 
over, in accordance with the Constitution. He was still seen by many as a stopgap, and 
as an improbable candidate for Chiang's other post, the Chairmanship of the KMT. 
Conservative forces were rumoured to be rallying around the frail figure of Chiang Kai-
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shek's widow, the nonagenarian Soong May-ling, who had returned from the US for the 
centenary celebrations for her husband in 1986. However, with the backing of the 
reformists now in the majority of KMT hierarchy, as well as the key tacit support of the 
military Chief of Staff, General Hau Pei-tsun, Lee was soon made acting Chairman of 
the KMT, and was confirmed in the post at its 13* National Congress in July. Despite 
the alleged weakness of his own position, Lee Teng-hui was soon to show himself intent 
on pursuing reform with even greater gusto than his predecessor. 
In April 1994, Lee accepted an interview with a Japanese scholar. He stated his view of 
'the sadness of Taiwanese'. He said the KMT was a 'regime from external'. Later, he 
emerged the ideas of 'Taiwanese identity', such as 'ROC on Taiwan', 'New Taiwanese 
People', 'Popular Sovereignty'. Therefore, Beijing started firmly believing that Lee 
Teng-hui was advocating Taiwanese independence. In the island, native Taiwanese and 
some Taiwanese independence activists placed certain expectations of Lee. They 
thought that Lee could be pushing the establishment of an independent country on 
Taiwan. In the 1996 presidential election, 'There were almost 40% changed their 
political position from supporting the DPP's Peng Ming-min, turning to support Lee 
Teng-hui. They "give up Peng, support Lee'". (39) 
Obviously, the rise of Lee Teng-hui has given the traditional opposition a serious trial. 
The DPP faced the challenge from both the transformation of the KMT and Taiwan's 
political democratisation. The KMT's localisation has changed itself into a 'Taiwan 
KMT' , not an alien regime any more. The DPP has been introspecting the traditional 
view of Taiwanese independence. The opposition people proclaimed 'self-
determination'. As an editor of the opposition magazine said, 'we can not say 
"independence" here, because we still can be put in jail . So we say "self-determination". 
That means the people in Taiwan have the right to choose their future.' (40) But the rule 
of the game has been changed. On 15 May 1992, Article 100 of the Criminal Code of 
the ROC was amended to legalise the expression as well as the idea of Taiwanese 
independence within the scope of freedom of speech. The problem now is inside the 
DPP. Different views on the issue of Taiwanese independence have brought a series of 
factional infighting, and even caused the division of the party. 
What is Taiwanese independence? Chang Chun-hong, the third term general-secretary 
of the DPP, defined the meaning of 'Today's Taiwan Independence Movement': 
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First, Taiwanese independence refers to the demarcation between Mainland China and 
Taiwan, the latter of which refuses to be ruled by the Communist mainland regime. 
Secondly, Taiwanese independence means the master of Taiwan should be the majority 
of indigenous Taiwanese. Thirdly, Taiwanese independence connotes the 
democratisation of all of Taiwan's politics. Only through democracy can the Taiwanese 
eventually and eternally become the 'Master of Taiwan'. And fourthly, Taiwanese 
independence means striving for Taiwan's international status, identity, and dignity. 
(41) 
Chang said that points 1 and 2 have actually been realised. Taiwan in fact is de facto 
independence under KMT rule. In other words, the KMT as well as the DPP, both do 
not wish Taiwan to be reunified with the CCP. What the KMT has done in past years is 
to build a KMT-style Taiwanese independence state (that is, the so-called 'B-type 
Taiwanese independence'). (42) 
The emergence of the Taiwan Independence Movement could be roughly divided into 
three stages with each stage reflecting the political environment, both within and outside 
of Taiwan at various times. (43) 
The 228 Incident in 1947 and the misgovernment of the ruling KMT in Taiwan in the 
1940s highlighted the first stage of the Taiwan Independence Movement. Taiwan 
dissidents escaped overseas after the 228 Incident. This incident sowed the seeds of 
discord and hatred between the expatriate mainlanders and the indigenous Taiwanese 
and became the principal cause of the Taiwan Independence Movement at this stage to 
overthrow the expatriated KMT regime. 
In the second stage, before 1980, the Taiwan Independence Movement was motivated 
by the KMT's authoritarian rule and the mainlanders' continuous monopoly of political 
power. The KMT for its part espoused its 'legitimacy theory', that meant its Parliament 
represented the whole of China. It refused to hold a complete re-election, abolish 
martial law and stop depriving people of their constitutional rights. Dissidents were 
arrested and persecuted including those who involved in the case of Lei Chen (44) and 
the Kaohsiung Incident. A l l of these circumstances further upset the indigenous 
Taiwanese. The main purpose of the Taiwan Independence Movement at this stage was 
to promote the democratisation of Taiwan in the face of strict KMT rule, and to oppose 
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the PRC's incorporation schemes. Although under the KMT's authoritarian rule the 
Taiwanese were restricted from political participation, they did enjoy an improved 
economic life, a benefit that has relaxed, to some extent, their discontent with the KMT. 
After the 1980s, the Taiwan Independence Movement had entered into the third stage. 
More democratic policies have been introduced by the KMT. Democratisation has 
improved relations between the KMT and dissident Taiwanese. For example, martial 
law was lifted, and this resulted in the formation of political parties including the DPP. 
Further, the bans on freedom of the press was lifted, Taiwan had 28 newspapers. At 
present Taiwan has 300 registered newspapers. (45) 
Nevertheless, as Chang Chun-hong has said the goals of the Taiwan Independence 
Movement have not been fully realised in his definition to Taiwanese independence. 
The task of democratisation in Taiwan needs further improvement and perfecting. The 
most urgent task is to reintroduce the 'newly-packaged' Taiwan with a popularly elected 
government into international society and to secure the nation's recognition from other 
countries. Therefore, Chang has argued, i f the KMT intended to eliminate the voice of 
Taiwanese independence, it should immediately institute true democracy rather than 
repress the independence movement. He said that only by implementing democracy 
could Taiwan obtain the world's sympathy and support, and increase the possibility of 
Taiwan's return to the international community. (46) 
In other words, the current stage sees the Taiwan Independence Movement pushing the 
KMT to implement democracy in the domestic arena while pursuing Taiwan's return to 
global society in the international arena. Antonio Chiang, publisher of a liberal and non-
KMT-owned weekly magazine called The Journalist, pointed out, 'Sure, some (Taiwan) 
people believe in Taiwanese independence, but for most people independence is just a 
code word for more democracy. Independence is a very vague, ambiguous word. It is 
not a legal term in Taiwan anyway. There's a psychological and emotional attachment 
to that term. And a political one, of course'. (47) 
The above discussion indicates how the concept and nature of the Taiwan Independence 
Movement has been transformed since the 1940s. This movement has its merits in that it 
has stimulated the development of Taiwan's democratic politics. This democratisation is 
vital for the lengthy peaceful reign of the ROC government, and serves as a model to 
30 
influence the PRC as well. To the KMT, the Taiwan Independence Movement is not a 
completely disadvantageous entity, despite the fact that the Taiwan Independence 
Movement has challenged the ROC's legitimacy. For example, the KMT could use the 
Taiwan Independence Movement as the expression of public opinion and a reason for 
incorporating with the mainland. As well, the Taiwan Independence Movement 
provides a counter to Beijing's isolation strategy. Taipei has so far never explicitly 
advocated the idea of Taiwanese independence. However, any relaxation of Taipei's 
policy toward the Taiwan Independence Movement might lead Beijing to worry that 
Taipei wi l l side with the movement and seek Taiwan's independence. Under this 
circumstance, Taipei's foreign policy would become far less responsive to Beijing. 
Taipei can let Beijing understand that would generate political problems for the ruling 
KMT, and might boost the prospects and the power of the Taiwan Independence 
Movement in Taiwan. This situation would be obviously disadvantageous to both 
Taipei and Beijing. Hence, both the CCP and the KMT, from this viewpoint, would 
appear to share a common interest in preventing Taiwan's independence from becoming 
a reality. 
1-5. The Setback of the Taiwan Independence Movement 
1-5-1. The 1991 National Assembly elections 
The DPP continued to bring into prominence of the Taiwanese independence issue. The 
KMT, however, did not resort to using the law against Taiwanese independence. But in 
1991 National Assembly elections, Taiwanese people used their votes to express the 
attitude toward Taiwan's independence. In 1991 December elections campaign period, 
the KMT told people that Taiwan's independence would bring disaster to Taiwan 
because the PRC would attack Taiwan, i f necessary, to stop any move toward formal 
independence. 
The KMT's strategy apparently paid off. The DPP in the 1991 National Assembly 
Election, because of its vehemently separatist stance, only acquired 23.94% of votes in 
the elections while the KMT parlayed that dread of uncertainty into a 71.17% landslide 
at the polls. Noteworthy, even Lin Cho-shui, the leader of the New Tide faction and 
radical independence activist, failed in the elections. There was no doubt that the result 
of this election was not only a setback of the DPP but also a blow to the Taiwan 
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Independence Movement. In an interview with the New York Times, Hsu Hsin-liang, 
the former chairman of the DPP, admitted that the 'cause of Taiwanese independence' 
scared of f voters in December's 1991 National Assembly Election and led to the failure 
of the DPP platform. (48) 
1-5-2. The 1996 presidential election 
The DPP has known that the Taiwanese independence issue was a 'poison' to the 
elections in Taiwan today. But it was almost impossible for the DPP to avoid touching 
the independence issue in the first directly electing presidential election. Especially, the 
DPP's candidate Peng Ming-min was a radical Taiwanese independence advocator. He 
handed out a 'Taiwanese people self-rescue declaration' to advocate Taiwanese 
independence in 1964. For that he was arrested and jailed, and has had 8 years 
imprisonment. But later he was released by the special pardon from the president. In 
1970, he escaped for Sweden, then went to the US, and started to go into exile until 
1992. (49) 
Peng beat Hsu Hsin-liang in the DPP's presidential preliminary selection. Later in the 
formal campaign, Peng's campaign headquarters vetoed the ideas of 'Great 
Reconciliation, Great Coalition' (50) as the campaign slogan, and used 'Peace, Sanctity, 
Taiwanese President' which with a strong significance of Taiwanese independence was 
used instead'. (51) 
The result of the first popular presidential election was a great blow to the advocates of 
independence. KMT's Lee Teng-hui won 54% of the vote, but Peng gained just 21%. 
That was the lowest support in the history of elections for the DPP. 
The presidential election has aggravated the in-fighting within the DPP. The radical 
Taiwanese independence advocators started their plan for establishing the new party. On 
9 t h April, 1996, Peng declared the formation of 'The Nation Building Union of Taiwan' 
(NBUT), and he censured that the DPP's status on Taiwanese independence is 
unswerving. Later, the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP) whose members were from 
the DPP's radical independence advocators was formed formally on October. (52) 
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On 7 May, 1996, a group of the DPP's younger generation issued 'The Younger 
Generation's Platform of Taiwanese Independence Movement' to stress 'Taiwanese 
independence was not a sacred duty, but a realisable political view', 'Taiwanese 
independence was not the only political aim, but a road to realise the social reform', 'It 
was not certainly to use 'Taiwan' as the National name of the new nation. To change the 
name, the national flag, and the national theme are not the main purposes of the Taiwan 
Independence Movement'. The younger generation stressed 'Taiwanese independence 
is not the DPP's or any political organ's private property, but the public property of 
Taiwanese people' meaning that the Taiwan Independence Movement has exceeded the 
scopes of the political parties. It hinted 'Taiwanese sovereign independence', and 'it is 
not necessary to declare Taiwanese independence'. It is an expansion of the new 
Taiwanese independence discourse. (53) 
The meaning of the DPP younger generation's view on Taiwanese independence was 
that most of the Taiwanese have been tired of the arguments on the independence issue. 
Since then, the DPP has become a 'broker party' (54) whose main political aim is to win 
the election. Even though the division of the political opposition has weaken the forces 
of the DPP, it is good for it to use its power in making political policy but not to waste 
time on the arguments of 'reunification' of 'independence'. 
1-6. Conclusion 
The history of Taiwan's opposition movement has gone through the era of anti-KMT 
regime, and the era of fighting for democracy. For the political opposition, the most 
important political activities are to nominate the candidates for the elections. As we can 
see from the results of the elections in Taiwan, the DPP normally maintain about 30% 
of the support in each election. In local-level elections, it can win more than high-level 
elections, but it is difficult for it to defeat the KMT in" higher level elections. For 
example, in 1986, 1991, and 1996 National Assembly elections, the DPP only won the 
support of 19%, 24%, and 30%. Because the main function of the National Assembly is 
to amend the Constitution, it involves the issues of national identity. The DPP's 
insistence on Taiwanese independence gives the Taiwanese people the worry about 
changing the present situation of ROC. So it is difficult for the party to win the elections. 
But people in Taiwan still wish to have a strong opposition power to balance the ruling 
KMT. So on local-level issues, the DPP could win the support of the people. They could 
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even beat the ruling KMT. For example, in 1997 County Magistrates' and City Mayors' 
elections, DPP won 12 seats of the 21 countries and cities, and won 43% of the support. 
First time for it to surpass the KMT in the election. (See Table 4 and Table 5.) The 
leaders of the DPP have seen the trend. For example, on 9 t h September, 1996, because 
the radical Taiwanese independence activists were preparing to organise the TAIP, and 
they continued criticising the DPP have given up it position of Taiwanese independence. 
Julian J. Kuo, the former director of the DPP's Department of Information and Culture 
presented a statement stating that through the process of Taiwan's democratisation, the 
DPP has started its adjustment of the political line, and has developed the New Taiwan 
Independence Movement which was different from the traditional Taiwan Independence 
Movement. (55) After Kuo's statement, on September 11, the former chairman of the 
DPP, Shih Ming-teh said to the leaders of the TAIP, 'Other than the military revolution, 
the only way to realise independence and the establishment of a new country is through 
the existent political system'. (56) It is clear, some Taiwanese politicians have changed 
their political attitude on Taiwanese independence issue. Even though they were active 
Taiwanese independence advocates, but they has adjusted their attitudes to face the 
political reality 
Since then, democratisation and the KMT's process of Taiwanisation have been carried 
out. (57) There are two political problems in Taiwan now. The first one is to maintain 
the achievement of democratisation. The second one is to face the threat of China. The 
DPP's decision in finding out the problems is to take the regime of Taiwan through the 
elections. For matching most of the Taiwanese people's wish, the DPP would not insist 
to achieve the aim of Taiwan's independence de jure, but to seek the possibility of de 
facto independence. 
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Chapter 2. Factions within the Democratic Progressive Party 
2-1. Introduction 
During its founding period, the DPP was a grand alliance of various groups. The party's 
organisational structure emphasised conflicts between those factions. Due to the special 
nature of the relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan, a period of conflict is 
an unavoidable stage in the development process for Taiwanese political powers who 
want to stand in the forefront of Taiwan's future. Considering the reason above, factions 
must attempt to take a leadership position by insisting on their policies and ideology in 
conflicts with others. A clear and strong political stance can attract potential members 
from other factions. (1) 
2-2. Development of the political opposition factions in Tangwai era 
A study of the factions in the DPP must start by examining the reorganisation and 
development of the original local political forces during the Tangwai period. (2) This 
refers to the period which started in April 1977. At that time, Huang Hsin-chieh and 
Kang Ning-hsiang were trying to unite local political forces in order to reorganise them 
into an alliance. Opposition faction began to organise following the Chungli Incident of 
1977. Before the Chungli Incident, opposition factions shares very small aims, policies 
and ideologies opposed to the KMT's autocracy, but they competed against each other 
for political influence. However, because the Chungli Incident provided the power to 
oppose the KMT, it was a key point in the process of changing the autocracy to 
democracy. For this reason it was possible for opposition factions to compete with each 
other in terms of political philosophy and policies from then on. The reason why 
opposition factions did not confront each other at that moment is that they had a weak 
political influence. 
In 1979, when the centre of power in the opposition faction moved away from Huang 
Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang, the real Tangwai faction was founded. In 1969, 
Supplementary Legislator Huang Hsin-chieh (3) and his comrades, established 
Formosan Magazine. In 1972, Supplementary Legislator Kang Ning-hsiang gained the 
support of new rising intellectuals to operate the Eighties Magazine. During this period, 
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Huang and Hang competed with each other in terms of their political philosophy. 
Huang's line was a radical mass line with an aggressive attitude; Kang's was more 
moderate. (4) Huang was ahead in this competition until the Kaoshiung Incident of 
1979. Huang's organisation almost disintegrated when most of its leading members 
were imprisoned. 
After the Kaoshiung Incident, Kang made himself as the central power of Tangwai by 
reorganising the original Tangwai factions and new local political forces. The members 
were: family members of victims of the Kaoshiung Incident, defence lawyers of victims, 
elected representative and government officials: Fei Hsi-ping (Senior Legislator), 
Huang Huang-hsiung (Supplementary Legislator), Yu Ching (Member of Control Yuan), 
Yu Cheng Yueh-ying (Taiwan Provincial Assemblyman), Chiu Lien-hui (Pingtung 
County Magistrate), etc._. 
Because of the supplementary elections to the Legislative Yuan, Control Yuan, and 
local elections took place in 1980, Tangwai forces recovered a bit from Kaohsiung 
Incident by gaining the seats in the elections. ( See Chapter 1, Table 2) During this 
recovery, the leading forces within Tangwai adopted Kang's political line for a time. 
However, as the factions within Tangwai grew stronger, they developed different 
political opinions about the understanding of the KMT's ruling nature, political aims of 
the opposition movement, political philosophy, and the future of Taiwan. (5) 
In fact, the Tangwai organisation in the 1981 and 1983 elections showed clearly that the 
Tangwai's reorganisation were still in the pattern of alliance between local political 
forces and the Tangwai elected representatives, as had been established in 1977. The 
Tangwai Candidates' Campaign Committee which was organised by Tangwai's Central 
parliamentarians in October 1981, and the Tangwai Central Campaign Committee 
which was set up in September 1983, both attempted to give the priority on nomination 
to the incumbent representatives. The essence of their operation was based on the co-
operation of different political forces within Tangwai, and organisations constructed 
only provided political structures for communication and negotiation among different 
political forces. (6) Although the Tangwai at that time can be considered as an 
embryonic form of political party, and it operated exactly like a political party for 
nominating candidates, its power structure was still based around several politically 
powerful individuals instead of operating democratically. 
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For the reasons outlined above, a group of the radical opposition did not want the 
opposition resources to be monopolised by the elected representatives, they launched a 
campaign to 'criticise Kang' in 1982, in order to redesigning the political rule of 
Tangwai. This campaign focused on three points: 1) 'obstruction' versus 'negotiation'; 
2) 'reforming the system' versus 'reforming from within the system'; 3) 'the mass line' 
versus 'the parliamentary line'. (7) The group of people had three sets of members: the 
Kaohsiung Incident victims' relatives, defence lawyers and non-Tangwai younger 
generation members. The leading exponent was Hsu Jung-shu and the editors at her 
Shen Keng (Cultivation) Magazine, such as Wu Nai-jen, Chiu Yi-jen, Lin Cho-shui, Lin 
Cheng-Chien, etc._. (8) 
During this campaign, the younger generation suspected Hsu Jung-shu's political status 
was swerving, and this was the main reason for the break between her and the non-
Tangwai younger generation. Lin Cheng-chien set up the Chien Chin (Progress) Weekly 
after his political views diverged from those of Hsu Jung-shu. Subsequently, in 1983, he 
and his fellows organised the Progress Faction. Around the end of 1983, Wu Nai-jen, 
Chiu Yi-jen, Lin Cho-shui, and non-Tangwai younger generation figures organised the 
New Tide Magazine, this was the first appearance of the New Tide Faction. (9) During 
the supplementary elections for members of the Legislative Yuan at the end of the same 
year, because of the complainants about the right to nominate the candidates for the 
elections which was usually controlled by the elected representatives, the non-Tangwai 
younger generation organised Association of Tangwai's Editors and Writers, nine days 
before the Tangwai Central Campaign Committee was set up. After that, Lin Cheng-
chien had a disagreement about the future of Taiwan with the members of the 
'Association of Tangwai's Editors and Writers', then left the association and organised 
his own faction. Following the 1983 supplementary elections to the Legislative Yuan, 
Tangwai elected representatives (including Hsu Jung-shu) organised the Tangwai 
People's Representatives' Association for the Study of Public Policy in May 1984. The 
political fights between factions within Tangwai started, and lasting within the DPP. 
(10) 
According to the analyses above, we can make three points as follows. 
Firstly, The factional fight between the opposition has begun in the Tangwai era. It 
began at the time of the 1977 local elections. The serious conflicts between the factions 
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took place in 1982. But the mutual opposition factions were born in 1979. Later in 1984, 
the organisations of the factions were more mature. 
Secondly, the arguments on political lines and ideologies related to political power 
pursuing. The opposition figures could change their positions between different factions. 
Factions could be reorganised. 
Thirdly, before the foundation of the DPP on 28th September 1986, Tangwai political 
forces were divided into four factions: 1) New Tide Faction originated from Association 
of Tangwa's Editors and Writers and New Tide Magazine; 2) Kang and Supra-Factions 
that composed of the members of Tangwai People's Representatives' Association for 
the Study of Public Policy and elected representatives and local government officers; 3) 
Progress Faction which was led by Lin Cheng-chieh, his political status tended to 
Formosa Faction; 4) Formosa Faction which composed of the victims' relatives and 
defence lawyers of Kaohsiung Incident. (11) 
2-3. The relationship between factions within the DPP 
The relationship between the factions in the DPP is quite different now than in the 
initial stage. This change was brought about by competition and reorganisation. The 
factions at each plenary party congress were as follows: First Congress: the New Tide 
Faction, the Kang Faction and the Supra-Faction, the Progress Faction and the Formosa 
Faction; Second Congress: the New Tide Faction, the Kang Faction and the Supra-
Faction, the Progress Faction and the Formosa Faction; Third Congress: the New Tide 
Faction, middle Factions and the Formosa Faction; Fourth Congress: the Formosa 
Faction and the New Tide Faction; Fifth Congress: the New Tide Faction, middle 
Factions, the World United Formosans for Independence and the Formosa Faction; 
Sixth Congress: the New Tide Faction, the Justice Alliance, the Welfare State Alliance, 
the World United Formosans for Independence and the Formosa Faction. Each of the 
above factions has its own leaders, separate structure and different political views. 
Reviewing the development of above factions of the DPP can provide an explanation of 
political power distribution between the factions, and would be helpful for 
understanding the making of Mainland China policy under the structure of 'one China, 
one Taiwan' policy. In the following discourses, I am going to follow the times of the 
40 
party congresses to describe the development of the factional relationship within the 
DPP. 
2-3-1. The DPP's First National Congress and the Second National Congress 
(November 1986 - November 1987) 
During this period the Kang Faction, the Supra-Faction and the New Tide Faction were 
the main force in the party, and could therefore have an important influence on the state 
of affairs within the party. Because most members of Kang Faction and Supra-Faction 
were elected representatives who usually focused on the administration affairs and had 
little interest in party affairs, New Tide Faction could gain political power by 
controlling the Party Organising Committee, and co-operating with Hsieh Chang-ting 
and his supporters. The New Tide Faction and Kang Faction had a balance of power in 
the party. Later in the first term chairman election, the New Tide Faction helped Chiang 
Peng-chien to gain the post of chairman of the DPP; for he New Tide Faction this was 
the first step towards controlling the party. 
As the Formosa Faction, its political force was still weak because the leaders, Huang 
Hsin-chien and Chang Chun-hong were still in jail, and Hsu Hsin-liang having been 
blacklisted by the KMT government, was still staying in the US. (12) 
Such a faction, without a leader or a clear structure, could not compete with the Kang 
Faction, the Supra-Faction and the New Tide Faction. The Progress Faction, as the ally 
of the Formosa Faction, was also weak. 
2-3-2. The DPP's Second to the Fourth National Congress (November 1987 -
October 1991) 
On 30th May, 1987, Huang Hsin-chien and Chang Chun-hong were released from jail, 
and then they reorganised the Formosa Faction. Huang and Chang attracted new 
members to the Formosa Faction, which grew quickly, and gained 11 seats (as against 4 
previously) on the second Executive Committee and 4 seats (none previously) on the 
second Central Standing Committee. Yao Chia-wen gained the chairmanship, again due 
to the support of the New Tide Faction. The main controlling power was still in the 
hands of the New Tide Faction. The New Tide Faction's seats on the second Executive 
Committee were reduced from 13 to 7, and its seats on the second Central Standing 
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Committee from 7 to 5. The Kang Faction and middle Factions' places also reduced 
from 11 to 10 on the Executive Committee, and from 6 to 4 on the Central Standing 
Committee. (13) During the Second Congress, the factions within DPP were divided 
into three political groups and competed with each other. Comparing the situations at 
the First Congress and the Second Congress, the character of change was: the influence 
of elected representatives at the central and local government levels was growing, and 
becoming the mainstream of the party; the influence of the New Tide Faction, the Kang 
Faction and the Supra-Faction was diminishing. (14) 
In March of 1988, after Huang Hsin-chien and Chang Chun-hong joined the DPP, the 
Kang Faction and the Supra-Faction were starting to disintegrate, and their members 
were accepted by the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction. Huang's and Chang's 
activities put the main focus within the DPP on reorganisation. In order to claim 
controlling power over party posts, the political line, and policy-making, the Formosa 
Faction and the New Tide Faction debated the theory and implementation of several 
important political issues. The most prominent disputes were over the final result of 
treatment about the future of Taiwan and the relationship between Taiwan and China. 
For example, on 26th August 1988, Yao Chia-wen (New Tide Faction), Chang Chun-
hong (Formosa Faction), both published their opinions about 'Sovereignty and 
Democratisation' in the China Times. Yao expressed the view that the purpose of 
emphasising the independent sovereignty of Taiwan was to present the facts, that 
Taiwan is an independent country; and that the issues of Taiwan's sovereignty and the 
democratisation in Taiwan should be solved together. Chang's opinion was that the 
basis of the DPP's philosophy should transcend the issue of 'unification and 
independence', which only wasted the DPP's resource; furthermore, the democratisation 
in Taiwan was more important than to independence, and should be given greater 
priority in the initial stage. (15) 
There were two factors for the emergence of the dispute over the choice of political 
philosophies. The first one was about the third term chairman election. The Formosa 
Faction was in a hot competition with the New Tide Faction in the election. The second 
factor was about the competition between the new factions which just moved their 
headquarters to Taiwan, and the old factions. The World United Formosans for 
Independence and the World Formosan Association, and the Formosan Association for 
Public Affairs (FAPA), gradually moved their headquarters to Taiwan from the 
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beginning of 1990s, which expanded the competition for power between the various 
factions of the DPP. The first two above organisations held similar views to the New 
Tide Faction; the second two held similar views with Formosa Faction. (16) Therefore, 
the 'Homeland Visits Campaign' organised by overseas organisations and the 
conference in Taiwan of World Formosan Association, both presented the combination 
of different political philosophies of the above two overseas Taiwanese independence 
groups and the DPP's New Tide Faction and Formosa Faction. (17) During the period 
of power struggle between the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction, Lin Cheng-
Chien, the leader of Progress Faction, supported the Formosa Faction's Huang Hsin-
chien in the party's third term chairman election. Lin wrote an open letter to Chairman 
Yao Chia-wen clearly showed that he stood on the side of the Formosa Faction and 
overseas organisation. He challenged Yao's political philosophies, including over use 
the mass political line; insistence on Taiwan's independence would damage cross-
Straits relations; and the relationship between the DPP and overseas Taiwanese 
organisation was too close. (18) 
2-3-3. The DPP's Fifth National Congress (Since October 1991) 
During the period of the Third and Fourth Congress, when Huang Hsin-chien was the 
chairman, the Formosa Faction controlled more than half the seats on the Executive 
Committee and the Central Standing Committee, and therefore had great influence in 
the DPP. The New Tide Faction became the 'opposition' faction. To prepare for the 
next round of competition, the New Tide Faction organised 'The New Tide Office' 
outside the DPP, in order to organise and train people at the grass-roots level. 
Furthermore, they continually criticise the Formosa Faction. Faced with the obstruction 
and criticism of the New Tide Faction, the Formosa Faction organised 'The Hsu Hsin-
liang Office' to criticise the New Tide Faction in return. (19) 
However, after the 1991 third plenary session of the DPP's Fourth Central Committee, 
because the World United Formosans for Independence moved its headquarters to 
Taiwan, the deployment of factions changed structurally. At the same time, the ruling 
KMT launched a series of political reforms, Taiwan's political system began to change 
from autocracy to the democracy, and the development of the economy towards 
internationalisation and liberalisation. Taiwanese overseas independence organisations 
began to pay more attention to Taiwan. They tried to build their base in Taiwan legally, 
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and to escape the limitations imposed by the government. One notable case among them 
was the World United Formosans for Independence, which declared the establishment 
of 'Taiwan Headquarters' which it planned to move to Taiwan. (20) Led by the New 
Tide Faction, DPP factions which supported alliances with overseas independence 
organisations prepared for these organisations' 'Homeland Visits Campaign'. 
Furthermore, New Tide Faction wanted to make the DPP support for the World United 
Formosans for Independence conditionally on an undertaking not to use armed force. 
(21) 
Although the guiding principles, political lines, and strategies of New Tide Faction and 
World United Formosans for Independence appeared similar, differences of attitude 
could still be found between them. The World United Formosans for Independence had 
a more radical attitude on Taiwanese independence than the New Tide Faction. They 
could be seen as the members of 'Taiwanese Independence fundamentalism'. Also, the 
World United Formosans for Independence's adopted the 'Armed revolutionary' line, 
was different from New Tide Faction's 'Peoples' revolutionary' line. (22) 
In fact, the relationship between the two factions was 'neither hostile nor friendly', and 
could be described one of 'nervous co-operation'. Co-operation based on negotiation 
between those two factions might reduce the nervousness, but they were still in 
competition for political power within the party, and as the result, they would demand 
the re-distribution of the right of political power in the future. (23) 
2-3-4. The DPP's Sixth National Congress (Since October 1992) 
The era of control by factions was symbolised by the multiple factions present during 
the Sixth Nation Congress. Not only did the New Tide Faction and the Formosa 
Factions each present candidates for the chairmanship, but several alliances of other 
factions also put forward candidates. 
Shih Ming-teh, supported by the New Tide Faction, the Welfare State Alliance, and the 
World United Formosans for Independence and Justice Alliance, win the sixth term 
chairmanship election. 
Because the Formosa Faction still maintained superiority in the Executive Committee 
and the Central Standing Committee, it was the largest faction within the DPP even 
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after its candidate failed to be elected the sixth term chairman. Seats on the Executive 
Committee and the Central Standing Committee held by the various factions were: 
Formosa Faction (12:4), New Tide Faction (6:2), Welfare State Alliance (4:3), Justice 
Alliance (3:1), and the World United Formosans for Independence (2:1). (24) 
2-4. Conclusion 
According to the description above, the DPP's factions and the relationships between 
them were in a continuous state of development. Development usually progressed 
around the competition between the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction. After 
the Fifth National Congress, a situation of multi-factional leadership emerged, which 
was largely based on the rivalry between the Formosa Faction and the New Tide 
Faction. Not only the factions but also the political views and political lines were 
changed during the process of the DPP's development. In the general term, the Formosa 
Faction has moved towards the KMT's model; the New Tide Faction has moved 
towards the Formosa Faction's model; the World United Formosans for Independence 
try to progress by following New Tide Faction's model; and the Welfare State Alliance 
and the Justice Alliance have both tried to survive in competition with the other factions. 
The original conception of 'reform with the system' was not only adopted by the 
Formosa Faction and Kang's or Supra-Factions', but also accepted by the New Tide 
Faction and the World United Formosans for Independence. 
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Chapter 3. The Formulation of the Democratic Progressive 
Party's Mainland China Policy 
3-1. Introduction 
The establishment of the DPP was the result of a long term political opposition 
movement. It is better to look at it as an alliance of separate political opposition 
organisations than to regard it as a political organisation which has its special political 
consciousness. According to the earlier discussion in chapter 2, members of the 
opposition factions or groups in Tangwai era had no consensus about issues like 
economics, politics and the future of the nation. The only consensus within the 
opposition people was to oppose to the KMT's 'one-dominant-party system'. The 
situation remains after the establishment of the DPP. The factional fight always affected 
the party's policy making and political line. The party's policy about Mainland China 
was influenced by the competition mentioned above during its shaping and developing 
process. 
The purpose of this chapter is to research the shaping and developing of the DPP's 
Mainland China policy. The area of research covers the party platform, party 
constitution, and the process of designing of the Mainland China policy, and the party's 
policy on political reform. To achieve this purpose, the foundation of the DPP's 
Mainland China policy should be related to the relocation of the relationship between 
Mainland China and Taiwan. Based on the development of the party's platform, the 
process can be divided into three parts: 1) the period of self-determination by residents 
of Taiwan; 2) the period of claiming the independence of Taiwanese sovereignty; 3) the 
period of calling for the establishment of an independent state on Taiwan. Dividing 
the process in this way shows a clear progression from an unclear situation to the 
'quasi-two states and two governments' concept, and at last to the 'two-states and two-
governments' policy. 
3-2. The period of calls for self-determination by its residents of Taiwan (November 
1986 - November 1987) 
3-2-1. The formulation of the 1986's party platform 
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In the early stage of the founding of the DPP, the party platform combined both 
Taiwan's and China's ideologies. The terms, which related to the Chinese consciousness, 
like 'China's territory Taiwan' or the 'ROC, all replaced by the word 'Taiwan', also 
when mentioned about Taiwan's residents, the term of 'Taiwanese people' was used 
quite often instead of 'Chinese people' in the party platform. Even though it could not 
yet be identified as 'Taiwanese independence consciousness', doubtless, it has presented 
a very strong consciousness of Taiwan. The 1986 party platform also considered the 
1947 constitution of the ROC; this was the only part of the platform, which conceded 
the 'Chinese system', and showed a little bit of Chinese consciousness. (1) A very 
important point was, neither the goal of state unification nor the goal of Taiwanese 
independence, which were put into the platform. So the DPP could not be considered as 
a party with the consciousness of 'separating territory'. 
However, the party platform emphasized that 'the future of Taiwan should be 
determined by the residents of Taiwan themselves'. But there were many different ideas 
in the party about the questions of 'under which kind of situation', 'by which kind of 
way', and 'which kind of future' should the Taiwanese exercise the right of self-
determination. (2) During the period of the founding of the DPP, Kang and Supra-
Faction, Formosa Faction, Progress Faction, and the New Tide Faction were the main 
factions. Kang and Supra-Faction tended to 'self-determination approach'; Progress 
Faction favoured more the option of 'unification', but did not oppose the 'self-
determination approach'; the New Tide Faction strongly proclaimed an independent 
Taiwan. Because Kang and Supra-Faction, Formosa Faction, and Progress Faction held 
comparative advantages over the others, this made the plank of the party platform tend 
towards to the approach of self-determination on the 'Taiwan problem'. The option of 
the self-determination approach at least can release the pressure of conflict among the 
'independence factions' and the 'unification factions' inside the DPP, as the result of the 
fact that self-determination includes not only independence but also unification. 
In fact, the DPP declared several times that self-determination was not the same as 
'Taiwanese independence'. Independence was just one option of self-determination. 
Self-determination emphasised the procedure more than the result. However, the 
definition of self-determination was unclear. It meant that different factions were unable 
to achieve an agreement. The New Tide Faction thought that 'the right of self-
determination for the residents of Taiwan' meant Taiwanese independence. Compared 
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with the New Tide Faction's understanding, Formosa Faction, Kang and Supra-Faction, 
and Progress Faction perceived self-determination and Taiwanese independence were 
different. (3) So the factions achieved consensus in some parts of 'self-determination' 
through negotiation. 'Self-determination' became a political strategy and a temporary 
declaration. 
3-2-2. The formulation of the 1987's Mainland China policy 
Despite its support of the eventual independence of Taiwan, the DPP's Mainland China 
policy plank of its platform advocates in the short-term the normalisation of the 
relations between Taiwan and Mainland China through exchanges and contacts on the 
basis of peaceful coexistence and competition. 
In the period of Tangwai, because Taiwan then was under the KMT's one-party 
authoritarian rule, neither the moderate factions nor the radical factions was vocal on the 
issue of Taiwanese independence: they all did not want to challenge the KMT's 'one 
China' policy. The two groups both advocated building the relationship of 'three-links' 
(direct transportation, telecommunication, and investment links) with China. But that 
did not mean that they wanted to take the road of unification with China. They just 
opposed the KMT's policy of 'Three Nos' (no contact, no negotiation, and no 
compromise with Beijing) and Beijing's Taiwan policy of 'three links and four 
exchanges'. (4) The Tangwai people's opposition policy to both the KMT and Beijing 
was essential for Taiwan to reduce its isolation in the international society then. 
On 13th October 1987, the DPP at its Central Standing Committee Meeting passed the 
resolution entitled 'The Current Stage's Mainland China Policy of the DPP'. It stated 
that 'the future of Taiwan should be decided by the people of Taiwan'. (5) The 
important points of this resolution were: 1) People should be allowed to travel freely 
between Taiwan and the mainland, to visit relatives, to travel, to look for relatives, and 
also to freely exchange postal and telecommunication services, and to sweep their 
ancestors' tombs. 2) Contacts between individuals in the fields of culture, academic 
affairs, arts, technology and science, sports and economics should be processed on a 
basis of equality between Taiwan and Mainland China. 3) Both Taiwan and the 
mainland should abolish the policy of the use of force against each other. They should 
stop the infiltration of covert operations agents within each other's territories, and end 
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hostile political propaganda. By so doing, the relations between Taiwan and the 
mainland accordingly could be promoted from the stage of peaceful competition to the 
stage of peaceful negotiation, and mutual recognition. 4) The DPP's Mainland China 
policy would be divided into two stages. In the short term, Taiwan and the mainland 
should conduct the exchanges on an unofficial basis, while in the long term the two 
sides of the Taiwan Straits should hold political negotiations. Such negotiations, 
however, could only be held after the completion of Taiwan's parliamentary reform. 
In April 1989, the DPP further elaborated on its mainland policy based on the above-
mentioned four points. (6) 
3-3. The period of claiming the independence of Taiwan's sovereignty 
3-3-1. The party's policy-making 
Because of increasing independence claims inside the DPP during 1987, the DPP 
officially decided to write the article of The People of Taiwan have the right to pursue 
Taiwanese independence' into the party platform at the 7th plenary session of the party's 
First Central Committee on 2n d November 1987. Some members of the Executive 
Committee said that writing it into the party platform could increase the conflict 
between the DPP and KMT. They suggested that they could just make a resolution and 
pass it in the National Congress instead of writing it into the party platform. Then first 
the pressure of decision making on the DPP Headquarters could be eased, second the 
competition between moderate factions and radical factions could be calmed down. 
Furthermore, more consideration of the Taiwanese independence issue could be given 
widely inside the party and among Taiwan's society than before. Then, Yao Chia-wen 
(New Tide Faction) made a draft proposal and passed it in the Second Congress, which 
was written with the purpose of declaring that the people have the right to pursue 
independence, although this proposal left open which way - like the 'German Model', 
'Singapore Model', 'One country, Two governments', 'Great Chinese Federation', even 
including Beijing's 'One country, two systems', - might provide a suitable model for 
Taiwan. But the principle of self-determination had already been changed to 'People 
have the right to claim independence of Taiwan', which meant that the DPP's political 
pursuit of Taiwanese independence was becoming more and more strong. 
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3-3-2. The formulation the '417 resolution' 
The '417 Resolution' was passed in the first contemporary meeting of the party's 
Second National Congress, which was held in April 1988. It was an alternative to the 
plan of writing 'The People of Taiwan have the right to pursue Taiwan's independence' 
article into the party platform (also called the proposal of 'Taiwanese independence 
outline of the party platform'). To trace to it source, the making of the proposal of 
'Taiwanese independence outline of the party platform' was the result of the factional 
fight within the party. (7) 
On 17th April, a meeting was held to discuss the amendment of the party platform. The 
Formosa Faction's Yu Tan-fa disagreed with writing 'The People of Taiwan have the 
right to pursue Taiwan's independence' into the party platform. Kang and Supra-
Faction's Kang Ning-hsiang submitted an alternative proposal and suggested to shelve 
the original proposal. But the proposal of 'Taiwanese independence outline of the party 
platform' has won the support of the majority of the members of the party, the New Tide 
Faction insisted to adopt the original one. After a long arguing, Hsieh Chang-ting and 
the New Tide Faction's Chiu I-jen, Hung Chi-chang, and Wu Nai-jen, they submitted 
the second alternative proposal: The DPP would advocate Taiwan's independence i f the 
following four conditions occurred. (8) 1) i f the KMT unilaterally embarked on talks 
with the CCP; 2) i f the KMT betrayed the Taiwan people's interests; 3) i f the PRC 
forcefully reunified Taiwan; 4) i f the KMT does not sincerely attempt to bring about a 
genuine democracy. 
This resolution obviously reflected the DPP's deep mistrust of the KMT. The DPP 
attempted to take a pre-emptive action to prevent a 'sell-out' of the Taiwanese by the 
KMT and the CCP. It was an elastic resolution. This resolution did reveal the DPP's 
ulterior motive to promote Taiwan's independence through means of indirect expression. 
However, it could be interpreted that the DPP was so indirect about its pro-
independence leanings because of the tense political atmosphere and the situation in 
Taiwan at this time right after the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988. 
(9) 
3-3-3. The formulation the 1989's Mainland China policy 
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In July 1988, the DPP set up a group called 'The Mainland Policy Research Group', 
which was for handling the newest situation of the relationship between the Taiwan 
Straits after the ROC government allowed Taiwan's residents to visit their relatives in 
Mainland China. The members of the group consisted of Fu Cheng (Kang's and Supra-
Faction), Chang Chun-hong and Chen Shui-bian (Formosa Faction), Yang Tsu-chun 
(Progress Faction), and Lu Hsiu-i (New Tide Faction). In the group, the alliance of 
Kang's and Supra-Faction, Formosa Faction, Progress Faction, and the other side which 
was the New Tide Faction usually held different views on some issues. The main points 
about the relations between the Taiwan Straits that had been expressed by the members 
of the group were three: 1) The arguments about reunification and independence: the 
first three factions thought it should give up the argument of reunification or 
independence on handling the Taiwan Straits relationship; but the New Tide Faction 
thought the relationship between the two sides should be framed as a relationship of 
'country to country'; 2) The arguments about the exchanges of the economics and trade: 
the first three factions held an open attitude to this issue, but the New Tide Faction held 
a conservative attitude; 3) The arguments on the contacts with the CCP: the first three 
factions encouraged the members of the party to visit Mainland China, but the New Tide 
Faction opposed the DPP visiting the mainland. Although there were arguments among 
the faction on the above three issues, almost all factions had tried to deny the ROC's 
policy on proclaiming sovereignty over the mainland. (10) 
According to the faction's membership, and the power of every faction at that time, 
Formosa Faction, Progress Faction, Kang's and Supra-Faction were comparatively 
stronger than others. Therefore, the mainland policy, which was formed in 1989, 
reflected the opinions of the stronger factions. 
Firstly, the 1989 Mainland China policy did not identify the relationship between 
Mainland China and Taiwan as a 'country to country' one. And it inadvertently leaked 
that the current situation of the relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan was in 
a state of civil war, which meant that it gave tacit consent to 'One China'. (11) 
Secondly, the document implied that there was 'one country, but two reciprocal 
governments'. It has been mentioned above that the document gave tacit consent to 
'One China', however, at the same time, it regarded the CCP to give up 'One China' 
policy. Therefore, the meaning of the 'One China' in that document is ambiguous, it did 
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not say that was the ROC, or the PRC, (12) furthermore it could be considered to 
represent both of them. 
3-3-4. The formulation of the '1007 Resolution' 
On 26th September 1990, the leaders of New Tide Faction and Formosa Faction signed a 
proposal, put forward by the ex-chairman, Yao Chia-wen, called 'our sovereignty does 
not include the territories of the PRC and People's Republic of Mongolia (PRM)'. This 
proposal included six reasons and three resolutions. It asked the government publicly to 
declare that the sovereignty of the ROC did not include the territories of PRC and PRM 
and also suggested the PRC recognised Taiwan's sovereignty. The purpose of putting 
forward this proposal for the New Tide Faction was to enhance their independence 
position inside the DPP and submit it to the second session of the party's Fourth Central 
Committee, which might accept the independence position of New Tide Faction in the 
meeting and turned it into the DPP's policy. 
The original draft of the proposal which was submitted by the New Tide Faction 
combined both Chen Shui-bian's and Hsieh Chang-ting's opinions, and then it was 
modified literally. For example, 'sovereignty' was changed into 'exact sovereignty', and 
'territory' was deleted in order to avoid any legal sanction, which might be caused by 
the advocacy of Taiwanese independence. (13) 
After the '1007 Resolution' was adopted, the New Tide Faction further suggested 
setting up the 'Committee of Taiwan's Sovereignty Independent Movement' (CTSIM) 
in order to implement the resolution and promote the independence movement by a 
political organisation. Because the Formosa Faction purposely gave way to the New 
Tide Faction, the CTSIM finally was established in the party. (14) 
The passing of the '1007 Resolution' and the founding of the CTSIM provided such a 
change that the Formosa Faction considered ways of avoiding the party's breakup, and 
opposing the ruling KMT. And the Formosa Faction's deliberations let the New Tide 
Faction's idealistic Taiwanese independence requirement to take the place of Formosa 
Faction's 'de facto Taiwan's independence' that means Taiwan's sovereign 
independence is to maintain the present status of Taiwan. From that time on, the New 
Tide Faction's view of Taiwanese independence has become the main stream in the 
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party. 
3-3-5. The formulation of the Democratic Charter 
Before the National Affair Conference took place in June 1990, (15) the DPP prepared 
the Democratic Charter in advance, and was going to submit in the meeting. 
The Democratic Charter included three provisions about the Mainland China-Taiwan 
relationship. It used the 'quasi-two countries and two governments' to define the two 
sides relationship, and adhered to the principle of International Law and Security Rule. 
Based on the above principles, the DPP expressed its view about the Mainland China-
Taiwan relationship as follows: 1) oppose the PRC claim over the sovereignty of 
Taiwan; 2) both sides should respect each other's sovereignty and its power of 
governing; 3) the communication between two governments should follow the 
International Law and regular procedures; 4) the exchanges and co-operation between 
two sides should respect each other's domestic law. (16) 
3-3-6. The DPP's Legislative Group: the formulation of the Law of Relationship 
with Mainland China 
On 24th October, 1990, the 'New Parliamentary Research Office' that was organised by 
the New Tide Faction's Legislators presented the 'Law of Relationship with Mainland 
China' to respond to the 'Statute Governing the Relations Between People of the 
Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area', which was adopted by the ROC Ministry of 
Justice. The making of the New Parliamentary Research Office's 'Law of Relationship 
with Mainland China' was based on three foundations: 1) In terms of exact sovereignty, 
Taiwan is an independent country of Mainland China. 2) The PRC is a special 'foreign 
country', the relations between the ROC and PRC is different from the relations with 
the other countries. 3) Taiwan's national profits and security should be put into the first 
place, and the cross-Straits affairs should be supervised by the Parliament. (17) 
After the New Tide Faction presented its 'Law of Relationship with Mainland China', 
the Formosa Faction's Legislator Chen Shui-bian presented the faction's 'The Treaty on 
the Basis of Relations Between the PRC and the ROC on 30th October of the same year. 
The treaty adduced the Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic 
54 
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in 1972. The purpose of the New 
Tide Faction was to use the 'German model' to define the Mainland China-Taiwan 
relationship, and tried to define the relationship of the two sides of Taiwan Straits into a 
'two Chinas' model. (18) 
Eventually, the DPP's Legislators combined the 'Law of Relationship with Mainland 
China' and the 'The Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the PRC and the ROC, 
then presented the DPP Legislative Group's edition of 'The Draft of the Law of 
Relationship Between Mainland China and Taiwan'. The main body of the draft was 
based on the New Parliamentary Office's edition, and absorbed many ideas of the Chen 
Shui-bian's edition. At the same time, it also accepted Progress Faction's Lin Cheng-
chien's amendment proposal that had a strong trend of unification with the mainland. 
The main characteristics of the DPP Legislative group's 'The Draft of the Law of 
Relationship Between Mainland China and Taiwan' were: 
1) Considering the PRC as a hostile 'quasi-foreign nation', this draft of the law is the 
operating plan before the conflict has been reduced and the Basic Treaty has been 
signed up by the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. (Article 1 of the draft of the law.) 
2) The motive of the draft of the law departs from the concept of 'Taiwan common 
destiny', based on the view of 'exact sovereignty', the intermediary organisation 
should be considered as quasi-official, and supervised by the organs of people's 
representative. 
3) The relations between Taiwan and Mainland China apply international law, but the 
PRM is not included. 
4) The trade between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should require official 
permits. 
3-4. The period of proclaiming the establishment of an independent state on 
Taiwan 
3-4-1. Process of the formulation of 'Taiwan Independence Platform' 
After the '417 Resolution', the pro-independence activists in Taiwan further expedited 
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the task of realising Taiwan's independence. Several factors encouraged the tendencies 
of the Taiwan Independence Movement. Lee Teng-hui has become the first Taiwan-born 
President. This event brought great jubilation to some Taiwanese. The pro-independence 
activists intended to utilize this Taiwanese consciousness to promote Taiwan's 
independence. As far as the pro-independence activists were concerned, the unification 
of Germany, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the emergence of independent Baltic 
states, and Beijing's approval of the admission of the two Koreas to the UN have made 
the unthinkable much more tenable. The biggest factor behind the Taiwanese 
independence surge is the opening up of politics in Taiwan. Most restrictions on free 
speech and the press have been lifted. The December 1991 elections for the National 
Assembly would be the first in which all the seats would be contested by candidates 
from Taiwan. In Spring 1992, the 3,250 seat National Assembly would re-examine and 
no doubt revise the 1947 ROC Constitution that defined Taiwan as a part of China. Both 
the DPP and the pro-independence activists intended to make the December 1991 
election a referendum on independence. (19) 
On 25 t h August, 1991, the DPP held its People's Conference for the Instituting of a 
Constitution. During the session of the conference, the meeting delegates passed the 
constitutional draft for 'The Republic of Taiwan'. (20) In October 1991, during the 
party's 5 t h National Congress, a clause for the creation of a separate 'Republic of 
Taiwan' and 'Taiwanese independence' was presented by the New Tide Faction's Lin 
Cho-shui that was included in the DPP's party platform for the December 1991 
elections to the National Assembly. (21) 
On 12th August, the Formosa Faction lost the competence of the election for the 
Executive Committee. That made the faction follow the ideas of the pro-independence 
party representatives. Hsu Hsin-liang, showed a quite different attitude than before to 
support the proposal of building the Republic of Taiwan. Hsu said that the DPP's nature 
is a 'Taiwanese independence party'. The party's aim is to build an official independent 
country on Taiwan. The only argument within the party was about when would be the 
best time for introducing a formal title of the new country? Since the constitutional draft 
for the 'Republic of Taiwan' has been accepted by the party, therefore, the amendment 
proposal for the party platform should be passed as soon as possible. (22) The candidate 
for the party chairman's election, Shih Ming-teh, who was supported by the New Tide 
Faction, also supported Lin's proposal. (23) Furthermore, for winning the post of the 
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chairman, although some members of Formosa Faction opposed Lin's proposal, they 
still agreed to the New Tide Faction's idea of writing the Taiwanese independence 
article into the party platform in this congress. At last, after a series of intense 
arguments, the meeting unanimously adopted Chen Shui-bian's (Formosa Faction) 
amendment proposal for the guiding principle of the party's platform. 
Moreover, the factions of the DPP also achieved an agreement that the former use of the 
term 'CCP' in the party platform would be replaced by 'PRC. This clearly described 
the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits as a relationship of two 
sovereign states, but not two equal governments or two equal political entities in the 
structure of 'one country'. At this moment, the argument about democracy or 
independence, which one has the priory in Taiwan's future, ended with a consideration 
that the mainland policy should put independence onto the first place. The 'Taiwan 
independence platform' has finally become the highest guiding principle for the design 
of the party's Mainland China policy. 
3-4-2. The formulation of the 1992 'Guidelines for China policy' 
In May 1992, the DPP organised the 'Mainland China Policy Studying Group' to 
respond to the rapid developing relations between the Taiwan Straits, and the arguments 
for the definition of 'one China' within the KMT. This group composed of three 
members of Formosa Faction (Chen Chung-hsin, Yang Huang Mei-hsin, Hsu Ming-teh), 
two members of New Tide Faction (Chiu I-jen, Yao Chia-wen), and middle faction 
(Chen Shih-meng). (24) 
The 'Mainland China Policy Studying Group' published three parts of the draft of the 
'Plan for the Current Stage Cross-Straits Relations and China Policy' - 'Guidelines', 
'The Principle in Polities', and 'The Specialised Organisation for the Cross-Straits 
Relations'. As for the parts of 'Trade and Investment' and 'Culture and Society', 
because of the different views within the different factions, the group decided to publish 
them after more discussion and communication. (25) There were some points worth 
taking notice of. 'The sovereignty of Taiwan is independent, and does not belong to the 
PRC, Taiwan's sovereignty does not include Mainland China and Mongolia, the 
government of the PRC is the only legal government of Mainland China, (26) this 
definition not only considered the sovereignty of the ROC does not cover Mainland 
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China and Mongolia, but also considered that both the ROC and the PRC have no rights 
to claim Taiwan's sovereignty. In other words, it used 'one China, one Taiwan' as the 
definition of the Cross-Straits relations. This mainland policy was deeply influenced by 
the 'Taiwan independence platform'. Furthermore, the draft of the China policy did not 
take the stand of asking 'the KMT and the CCP to both to give up their insistence on 
"one China" policy', but argued 'against the KMT government's wrong policy of "one 
China'" instead. And it also suggested to 'use the international stratagem of "one China, 
one Taiwan" to search for the international space for living'. (27) 
So, all the evidences above provide a clear view that the pro-independence activists 
within the DPP not only worried about trade, but also social, and cultural 
communications between the Taiwan Straits. They were afraid that the cross-Straits 
exchanges would hurt the development of 'one China, one Taiwan'. 
3-5. Conclusion 
To sum up the discussions above, the following are the main points of the relationship 
among the factional politics in the DPP and the party platform, and the mainland policy 
and the views on constitutional reform: 
1. During the three periods of the development of the DPP's Mainland China policy, 
because of the rise of the factor of independence, the party's mainland policy has tended 
to be conservative, and the definition of the relationship thus evolved gradually towards 
'one China, one Taiwan'. 
2. Reviewing the development of the making of the party's platform and the making of 
the resolutions, the concept of self-determination was changing. The meaning of self-
determination was given by the stronger political force. And later it made the view of 
pro-independence activists rising gradually in the party. 
3. In the DPP, people who advocated unification, some by the reason of death or illness 
(Fu Cheng), some by reason of accident (Yu Tan-fa), or by losing competence with 
others, left the party. This made the force of those who advocated unification become 
more and more weak, finally the power of pro-independence has been raising in the 
party. 
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4. The DPP used the model of making resolutions ('Taiwanese people have the right to 
pursue Taiwan's independence', '417 Resolution', and '1007 Resolution') to cease the 
arguments about writing a Taiwanese independence article into the party's platform. 
They used a compromise policy to make a balance between the arguments for 
independence and unification, and the political reality that proclaiming Taiwan 
independence would cause the political tension. 
The background to the DPP's compromise policy was as follows: On the one hand, the 
policymaking centre of the party was usually paralysed by factional fights. On the other 
hand, the Progress Faction's Lin Cheng-chien supported Huang Hsin-chieh and Chang 
Chun-hong when they reintegrated and reorganised the Formosa Faction. The strength 
of the Formosa Faction then started growing rapidly. And because of the Formosa 
Faction's opposition and the middle factions' coordination, the party deferred the 
process of writing the article of 'Taiwanese independence' into the party platform. This 
also reduced the likelihood of conflicts over the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty between 
the KMT and the DPP. 
5. The balance of political power among the factions can influence the development of 
policy. The range of influences can be judged by examining the structure of the 
'Mainland China Policy Studying Group'. The seats in the group depended on each 
faction's force. For example, in the period of self-determination by residents of Taiwan, 
the Kang Faction was the most powerful in the party, so it had 3 seats in the policy 
making group. In the period of claiming the independence of Taiwan's sovereignty, 
Formosa Faction and New Tide Faction were equal in achievement, so both had 5 seats 
in the group. In the period of proclaiming the establishment of an independent state on 
Taiwan, the force of Formosa Faction was getting weaker, the number of its seats then 
reduced in the group, and it even had no place in the 'Cross-Straits Relations Group', 
which was organised in March 1993. 
6. During a certain period of time, the main ideas of designing mainland China policy 
usually came from the strongest faction, and then became the 'consensus' of the whole 
party. But it does not mean that the party's policy revealed totally the wil l of the main 
stream faction. Consequently, there were a series of 'decision making' by the factions 
behind the process of the policy making. And the 'decision making' usually came from 
the factional fight. 
59 
7. The argument about the political issue usually related to political force. Factions 
sometime changed their political theme to pursue political force. Under some conditions, 
they would accept other faction's view and exchange their political profits, for example, 
in the case of the passing of the 'Taiwan independence platform', Formosa Faction and 
New Tide Faction compromised, because both of them wanted to gain the post in the 
party. Or, the main factions sometimes tried to avoid conflict, which could cause the 
party's breakup. They would accept the other side's opinion temporarily and then delay 
the implementation, for example, the setting up of the CTSIM. 
8. Although different factions have different views on policy making, this does not 
mean that all the members of a certain faction can unite under a common idea of policy. 
For example, Welfare State Alliance and Justice Alliance are both organised by the 
members which have different views on some policies. But in the cases of the Formosa 
Faction and New Tide Faction, both of their members share a common view on certain 
issues. In addition, under special circumstances, different factions could share the same 
political view with one another. Even sometimes they would co-operate with the others 
temporarily, but it did not mean that the different factions would unite. The rule was that 
even i f different factions could share the same political opinion with others, they would 
still want to share political power to fit their own faction's profit. For example, in the 
cases of New Tide Faction and World United Formosans for Independence, they are 
both radical Taiwanese independence advocates, but competition still exists between 
them. 
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Chapter 4. The Democratic Progressive Party's China Policy 
Symposium in 1998 
4-1. Introduction 
After its victory in the 1997 local elections, the DPP was believed to be heading 
towards becoming the governing party of Taiwan's central government. According to 
the political environment, the KMT's impetus is decreasing; support to Lee Teng-hui, 
KMT's chairman, dropped to 47% after the 1997 elections. That was the first time that 
Lee's support went below 50% since he entered politics. (1) The significance of the fact 
is the possibility that the DPP may overhaul the KMT in the near future, and later gain 
the overall official governing power in Taiwan. But on the road to becoming the formal 
governing party, it needs first to present a suitable China policy, which can convince the 
Taiwanese people that the DPP is capable of undertaking the task of negotiating with 
Beijing. For the DPP, making a new China policy is not only a current strategy i f it is to 
be a responsible party, but also a key for it to open the door for becoming the ruling 
party in the future. 
'The Democratic Progressive Party's China Policy Symposium' which was held by the 
DPP Headquarters took place from February 13* to 15th, 1998 in Taipei. This was the 
first time the DPP held a formal meeting to discuss the relations between Taiwan and 
Mainland China. On the one hand, the meeting was replying to the needs to constitute a 
formal China policy from outside the political environment; on the other hand, it was 
also aiming to lay the foundation for becoming the governing party, and giving a chance 
for the different factions that hold different opinions on China policy in the DPP to 
exchange and discuss their ideas with one another. 
Apart from facing the situation of possibly becoming the governing party, the DPP's 
1998 China policy symposium was also the product of gaining political power within 
the party between different factions, especially focused on the factional fight between 
the two main factions—the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction. 
In the meeting, the Formosa Faction introduced a 'contact' policy— 'advance-west 
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boldly'—, and encouraged the overall exchanges between the Taiwan Straits. The New 
Tide Faction held a different view on the Mainland China policy: their 
'uncompromising' policy— 'base-strengthening and advance-west gradually'— and 
stood for limiting the exchanges between the Taiwan Straits. 
After three days of hot debating, the DPP reached a compromise. They combined the 
'advance-west boldly' policy and the 'base-strengthening and advance-west gradually' 
policy into a 'base-strengthening and advance-west' policy. However, this 
reconciliatory agreement did not really to be realised in the party. Arguments over the 
Mainland China policy are still an issue within the party. 
4-2. What are the 'advance-west boldly' and the 'base-strengthening and advance-
west gradually' policies? 
Taiwan is located off the eastern coast of Asia in the Western Pacific. Its western 
neighbor is Mainland China - the most potential market in the world today. The two 
sides of the Taiwan Straits are still confronting each other on politics. But it is 
impossible for Taiwan to ignore China's economic potential. How to make a suitable 
policy on the cross-Straits affairs that can ensure Taiwan's national security and 
economic development concurrently is a big issue for the DPP. Because the different 
factions hold different stands, they have different judgments on the situation of the 
cross-Straits; therefore their views differ on the China policy. 
In the DPP, the Formosa and the New Tide have both devoted time and research on 
Mainland China policy. Early in 1995, when attending the DPP's presidential 
preliminary election, Hsu Hsin-liang, former chairman of the DPP and important leader 
of the Formosa Faction, published The Rising People expanding his ideas on how to 
operate the mainland's market. He advocated the division of the economic affairs from 
the political affairs, and the 'advance-west boldly' policy. But his ideas were rejected by 
the main stream of the Taiwan independence groups within the DPP. As a consequence, 
Hsu paid the price of losing the campaign for the presidential preliminary election of the 
DPP. The New Tide is the faction which strictly insists that Taiwan should be 
independent from Mainland China. They advocated a 'no contact', 'no negotiation' 
policy with Beijing in the early years. Recently, they have slightly changed their attitude 
into 'base-strengthening'. Because of their lack of faith in Beijing, however, their 
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position on keeping their distance from Beijing has remained unchanged. 
What are the 'advance-west boldly' and the 'base-strengthening and advance-west 
gradually' policies? In brief, 'advance-west boldly' entails a compromising and contact 
policy. The Formosa wants to raise the economic issues instead of the political issues to 
reduce the possibility of conflicts in the Taiwan Straits. Taiwan needs to use its 
economic and cultural merits to invest China's market as soon as possible. 'Base-
strengthening and advance-west gradually' however is an uncompromising and 
opposing policy. The New Tide still insists that China is Taiwan's biggest enemy; 
political problems need solving before any economic issue may be raised. As a result, 
Taiwan needs to ensure a relative autonomy from China's market. 
4-2-1. The 'advance-west boldly' policy 
The Formosa's approach to the China policy is the 'advance-west boldly' policy. 'West' 
is China. The 'advance-west boldly' policy aims to encourage the Taiwanese people to 
operate in the Chinese economic market. With regards to politics, it wishes to negotiate 
with Beijing, and to use a conciliation policy instead of a confrontation one. 
Concerning the 'advance-west boldly' policy, the Formosa considers that the Cold War 
is over, a new international order is emerging, and international economic co-operation 
has replaced political conflicts. Hsu Hsin-liang considers, i f Taiwan insists on 
confronting China, it wi l l isolate itself from the international community, and the 
pressure exercised by international forces wi l l only get stronger as a result. Taiwan 
needs to avoid isolation, and thus needs to join the international main stream- and not 
challenge the international reality nor challenge Beijing, and not advocate Taiwanese 
independence. With respect to the economic strategy, Taiwan needs to invest in the 
largest market in the world - China - in order to spur the upgrading of Taiwan's 
industries. (2) 
On the issue of the international situation, the Formosa believes that the international 
pressure pushing Taipei to negotiate with Beijing wi l l keep on increasing. I f Taipei does 
not give a positive reply, its position in the international community wil l be more and 
more difficult. (3) 
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Julian J. Kuo, a member of the Formosa, points out that isolation from the international 
community would generate an even bigger crisis for Taiwan. Playing a key role and 
helping create the agenda in the process of China's joining the new international order 
is a chance for Taiwan to seek a living space in the international community for the 
future. Furthermore, in the process of Taiwan's joining the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), Taiwan should negotiate with China the issue of direct transportation with 
Mainland China. Kuo considers, however, that opening the door to three-links to 
Mainland China is not a prerequisite for Taiwan's entering the WTO, but on the other 
hand making a compromise with China in advance can only benefit Taiwan. (4) 
Kuo adds, that the China-US co-operation wil l touch sensitive issues, such as how to set 
the military powers in Asia yet, Taiwan wil l not get a voice on these issues; time is not a 
factor on Taiwan's side. (5) 
On the international and the cross-Straits economic relations, the Formosa considers 
that Taiwan should use three-links to release the pressure coming from the international 
community. (6) 
On the arguments on Taiwan's sovereignty and on the negotiations with Mainland 
China, Hsu Hsin-liang advocates avoiding the arguments on the sovereignty issue and 
raising the economic negotiations instead of the political negotiations. Chou Po-lun, a 
member of the Progress Faction, a branch of the Formosa, considers that the two sides 
of the Taiwan Straits have firstly to admit that there are disagreements on Taiwan's 
sovereignty; then only can the two sides start to negotiate on other issues. (7) 
On the developing strategy of the cross-Straits' trade, because investing in the 
developing China is a good opportunity for Taiwan's economics, the Formosa considers 
that Taiwan should 'advance-west' first, then come back to get the strength of 'base-
strengthening'. (8) 
On the economic relations between Mainland China and Taiwan, the Formosa considers 
that the economic affairs between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits are dependent on 
each other, that China needs Taiwan's capital and industrial techniques, and that Taiwan 
needs China's labour and market. Therefore the 'advance-west boldly' policy would not 
incur drawbacks for Taiwan's industrial development. (9) 
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4-2-2. The 'base-strengthening and advance-west gradually' policy 
The New Tide's approach to the China policy is the 'base-strengthening and advance-
west gradually' policy. Their attitude towards the China policy entails an 
uncompromising policy. They consider that China is a potential enemy of Taiwan. Even 
Taiwan can not ignore the big Chinese market. But Taiwan still needs to protect its 
national security. The first need is to adopt a 'base-strengthening and advance-west 
gradually' policy regarding economics and politics; then only would it be possible to 
'advance-west'. 
With regards to the 'base-strengthening and advance-west gradually' policy, the New 
Tide does not believe in the formation of a new international order under the 
international compromise reached after the Cold War. The present international 
situation mixes both compromises and conflicts at the same time, hence any danger for 
Taiwan would not come from isolation, but rather from a lack of national identity. I f 
Taiwan insists on investing in China's market, the Taiwanese identity may become 
subverted, and Taiwan's international status would be lowered. The New Tide does not 
consider the international pressure on Taiwan as being serious; because the Western 
countries still strive to contain the Communist China, Taiwan remains useful to the 
Western world. For Taiwan itself, the most important thing is to upgrade its industries, 
not to invest in China's market, it also has to avoid getting too close to China, because 
China is a tremendous market— i f it does, it wi l l be at risk of being absorbed by 
China's market. 
On the issue of the international situation, the New Tide considers that the new 
international order has not been completed, and that international transmutations in the 
future wi l l be varied. Taipei needs not put itself under pressure. (10) 
In the New Tide's opinion, negotiating with China should be objected to the pressure of 
time. For example, on the issue of entering the WTO, Legislator Lai Ching-lin stresses 
that there is no precondition on the issue of Taiwan's entering the WTO, and that it is 
not necessary for Taiwan to negotiate with China on the issues of three-links in advance. 
The three-links issue should not be mixed with the issue of entering the WTO. (11) 
The New Tide's Legislator Lin Cho-shui says that Taiwan should show good wil l to 
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China. At the same time, Taiwan still needs to show its determination in order to 
maintain its equal and independent political position and also the needs for defence 
against China. Taiwan simply needs to give a clear-cut signal with a good wi l l of its 
wish to have talks and to negotiate on specific functional issues. (12) 
Lai Ching-lin considers ill-founded the Formosa's judgement on the US-China relations 
after the Clinton-Jiang's talks in 1997. The Formosa's position on China and the US 
building 'the strategic talks' or 'the constructive strategic partnership' is too pessimistic. 
The New Tide's analysis of the new international frame is that the US and Japan wil l 
strategically unify in order to stop China's military expansion in the Asia-Pacific region 
in the Post-Cold War era. The US especially need to maintain the existence of Taiwan 
in order to impede on China's expansion. Only i f the Chinese force increases to the 
point that it is strong enough to break the balance wil l Taiwan's security be at risk. The 
New Tide's analysis reveals that Taiwan's strategic position is more important than ever 
before under the US containment policy to China. (13) 
On the international and the cross-Straits economic relations, the New Tide considers 
that Taiwan needs to negotiate with China, but the negotiation should not be done under 
any pressure. (14) 
On the arguments on Taiwan's sovereignty and negotiations with Mainland China, Lin 
Cho-shui advocates building a 'cross-Straits platform' which would provide a bridge for 
dialogue between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. The two sides can start talks about 
the issue on the sovereignty through the platform, and negotiate on general affairs but 
do not need to be involved in the sovereignty issue. (15) 
On the developing strategy of the cross-Straits' trade, the New Tide considers that 
Taiwan should 'base-strengthen' first, and then only wi l l it achieve enough strength to 
'advance-west'. (16) 
On the economic relations between Mainland China and Taiwan, in the New Tide's 
view, i f Taiwan's products over-rely on China's market, this restrain Taiwan's 
industrial development. Therefore Taiwan should target its market onto the whole world. 
(17) 
67 
In fact, the difference between the 'advance-west boldly' and the 'base-strengthening 
and advance-west gradually' policies is caused by the different judgements of the two 
factions on the economic situation. The New Tide's view is that Taiwan has been the 
largest investor in China's market in the world. Therefore, it is not necessary for Taiwan 
to match Beijing's 'two-sides trick' of 'using economics, compelling politics' and 
'dividing economics from polities'. They believe that the 'advance-west boldly' policy 
fails to see the issue of Taiwan's national security. They believe that the Taiwanese 
government should adopt an 'advance-south' policy, encouraging Taiwanese 
businessmen to invest the Southeast Asian market instead of 'advancing-west'. (18) 
4-2-3. Consensus between the 'advance-west boldly' and the 'base-strengthening 
and advance-west gradually' policies 
The two main factions have different opinions in many ways. But there are still some 
consensuses between them. 
1) On the issues of the international situation, the Formosa and the New Tide both agree 
that a new international economic order is forming under the lead of the US. (19) 
2) On the international and the cross-Straits economic relations, the Formosa and the 
New Tide both agree that there is pressure from the international community. (20) 
3) On the arguments on Taiwan's sovereignty and negotiations with Mainland China, 
the factions have reached the consensus that Taiwan's sovereignty is independent from 
China, and that it is not negotiable. (21) 
4) On the developing strategy to the cross-Straits' trade, the consensus within the DPP 
is that both 'advance-west' and 'base-strengthening' are necessary processes for Taiwan 
to face Mainland China's market. Their difference of opinion only lies on which should 
come first. (22) 
5) On the economic relations between Mainland China and Taiwan, the factions hold 
the same view that it is inevitable for Mainland China and Taiwan to interact 
economically. (23) 
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4-3. Process of the DPP's 1998 China Policy Symposium 
4-3-1. Background 
The factional fight within the DPP has lasted for a long time. As we can see from the 
party's history, policy-making in the party is a process of fighting and compromising. 
The party's 1998 China policy is but another example of policy-making within the 
party. 
After he led the party to win the 1997 elections, Hsu Hsin-liang, former chairman of the 
DPP and important leader of the Formosa Faction, announced that he would step down 
from the campaign for the 9 t h chairman of the DPP. Hsu is aiming for the position of 
president. Creating a new prospect on the cross-Straits relations has given him a chance 
to accumulate his counters in the campaign for the 2nd presidential election in 2000. (24) 
He was very well prepared. His book The Rising People was published in 1995. This is 
the first book which gives a systematic account of all projects and analyses on matters 
relating to the mainland policy in the DPP. 
The New Tide Faction has nonetheless gained good experience in co-operating with the 
Formosa Faction in handling the party machine in recent years, and the relationship 
between the two factions is better than ever before, although there remain differences in 
their approaches to governing. The New Tide insists that the DPP alone should govern 
the central government, while in the Formosa's view, the DPP has not had the 
experience to rule the central government, so it needs to form a coalition government 
with the KMT. With regard to Mainland China policy, there is also a big difference 
between the two major factions. The New Tide's 'base-strengthening and advance-west 
gradually' policy wi l l try to limit Taiwan's investment in Mainland China. (25) But in 
the view of Formosa's 'advance-west boldly' policy, Mainland China's market is 
tremendous, and Taiwan has no choice but to invest in it in order to gain a better 
position on the market. I f Taiwan does not do so, it wi l l soon lose its economic 
superiority in the world, and its political position wil l then be more endangered than it is 
at present. (26) 
As for the former Taipei mayor Chen Shui-bian, the most powerful figure in the DPP at 
present, he adopts the strategy of avoiding to get directly involved in the arguments 
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about China policy. He did not join the meeting to give his support to Hsu Hsin-liang, 
who wil l be his powerful competitor for the 2000 presidential election in the DPP. 
However, the Legislator Shen Fu-hsiung, a member of the Justice Alliance that is led by 
Chen Shui-bian, joined the symposium to present the view of his faction. Though Shen 
himself did not show a very clear idea about the China policy, he attacked Hsu's ideas 
ruthlessly in the symposium. Shen's attempt to downplay Hsu was very clear. Overall, 
he was just the representative of the Justice Alliance at the symposium. It was quite 
clear that the Justice Alliance did not have any general idea about the China policy. 
Chen Shui-bian's view on the China policy is not clear either. On the one hand, he 
opposes 'three-links' (direct transportation, telecommunications, and investment links 
with Mainland China) with Mainland China right away, but at the same time, he does 
not object to negotiate with Beijing on the issue of 'three-links.' Actually, his view on 
Mainland China policy is not so different from Hsu's. He simply does not wish to see 
the DPP involved in this troublesome issue at the moment. Expressing a clear idea on 
Mainland China policy is not sensible for Chen now, for a faulty step may affect his 
prospects in the campaign of the 2 n d presidential election in 2000. 
The other factions, including the Welfare State Alliance, led by Shieh Chang-ting— the 
incumbent Kaohsiung city mayor who was elected in 1998— and the World United 
Formosa for Independence, do not agree with Hsu Hsin-liang's 'advance-west boldly' 
policy either. They take the opposite attitude to the Formosa. Therefore, the main theme 
of the DPP's China policy symposium was to debate the Formosa's 'advance-west 
boldly' policy versus the New Tide's 'base-strengthening and advance-west gradually' 
policy. The other factions supported the New Tide, and objected to the Formosa. 
4-3-2. Process and conclusion 
There were three main topics in the DPP's China policy symposium (27): 
1) The effect of the Post-Cold War order of international politics on the Taiwan-China 
cross-Straits relations; 
2) The cross-Straits commerce and trade policies and regulations; 
3) The development of the cross-Straits trade relations, and the policies to address the 
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challenges of entering the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
The Formosa Faction that advocates the 'advance-west boldly' policy and the New Tide 
Faction which advocates the 'base-strengthening and advance-west gradually' policy 
had a very hot debate at the meeting. The distinctions in their views were caused by 
different judgements and views of the political situation. (28) 
The two main factions, the Formosa and the New Tide, both raised many reasons in 
support of their views on China policy. However, their strategies seemed diametrically 
opposite. The most important reason is that because their attitudes on the issue of 
Taiwanese independence are in agreement, they adopt different analyses on their China 
policy. 
What is Taiwan independence? There are thousands of definitions. The radical 
fundamentalists of the Taiwan Independence Movement believe that Taiwan should 
change the national flag and the official national title. They do not see Taiwan as an 
independent country. Taiwan should officially announce its independence to the 
international community. (29) The moderates' view is to keep the present social 
structure in Taiwan. Chen Wen-chien, the ex-director of the DPP's Department of 
Information and Culture, said that Taiwanese independence would maintain the present 
situation and life style in Taiwan, and confirm and protect this situation. (30) Moreover, 
the Formosa considers that Taiwan 'has been independent', and that the DPP's task is to 
protect independent Taiwan. (31) But the New Tide's aim is closer to building an 
official state - the Republic of Taiwan. In 1991, it was because of the insistence of the 
New Tide that the Taiwanese independence article was put onto the party platform. The 
New Tide wants to build an official state, and the Formosa only wants to preserve the 
present situation. Their different opinions on Taiwanese independence therefore have 
led to differing views on the China policy, and the frame of the policy. 
To a very large degree, Taiwan's lifeline is economic activity. The DPP's factions know 
it very well. However, the problem is that Taiwan cannot avoid becoming China's 
trading partner, and Taiwan and China are still on opposite sides in politics. For the 
DPP, it is difficult to agree on a policy on economic affairs without getting into political 
arguments. The factions which are closer to the position in favour of Taiwan 
independence, such as the New Tide, advocate limiting Taiwanese businessmen's 
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economic activities in China; but the factions which are not so obstinate on the issue of 
Taiwanese independence, such as the Formosa, are prone to a division between the 
economic affairs and the political affairs. 
Hsieh Chang-ting from the Welfare Alliance considers neither the 'advance-west 
boldly' nor the 'base-strengthening and advance-west gradually' options. The 
Taiwanese government should control them both by economic means, and evaluate the 
ensuing effects; then it should be able to make an overall policy on practising a planned, 
safe, and subjective economic interchange between the cross-Straits. (32) 
The Formosa Legislator Chang Chun-hong points out that Taiwan knows the 
international community better than China. At the same time, it also knows China better 
than the world. I f Taiwan cannot play a key role in the process of China's 
modernisation, it will be very difficult for Taiwan to establish a better position in the 
international community. (33) 
On the judgements of the future of China's economic development, all the factions of 
the DPP hold the same view that China's economic growth rate wi l l decrease, although 
the future of its market wi l l remain good. The Formosa considers that China's market is 
unstable and uncertain, and therefore not safe for investment. But from now on til l the 
year 2000, China is still the best market in the developing countries, and Taiwan must 
seize the opportunity to get a good place in this market. However, the New Tide admits 
that it is difficult to ban the cross-Straits economic activities, and some of Taiwan's 
industries, such as high-tech industry, have to be restricted to go into China. They 
encourage the service industry to enter China' market instead. (34) 
Although the different factions held different views on many issues, they still had a 
strong consensus on 'expanding the common ideas, narrowing the deviations'. (35) 
Based on the needs of the general goal - to be the ruling party - , the leaders of the 
different factions always adjusted their views in time to work out a joining point 
between the different opinions. 
On 14th February, the second day of the meeting, Hsu Hsin-liang adjusted his view on 
'the two sides of the Taiwan Straits negotiate on the issues of three-links' to 'the overall 
cross-Straits negotiating'. He pointed out that the strategy is to set the economic and 
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social interactions as the principal axis, and to take care of the issues of general affairs 
at the same time. The New Tide's leader Chiou I-jen accepted Hsu's view on 'the 
overall cross-Straits negotiating.' He said: 'Chairman Hsu's view is quite close to the 
New Tide's', and 'Chairman Hsu has created the possibility of negotiating with China 
on everything.' As a result, the two main opposing factions expressed their good wil l to 
each other, and the consensus thus went higher. On 15th February, Hsu Hsin-liang 
dropped his insistence on 'advance-west boldly', and changed the title into 'planned 
advance-west' policy. Because Hsu was willing to accept second best, he won more 
support in the DPP. For example, Hsu Yang-ming from the Justice Alliance said in the 
meeting that he opposed the 'advance-west boldly' policy at first, because he did not 
know how bold it would be? yet after discussion, he inferred that Hsu Hsin-liang's 
'advance-west' policy was not so acute, and that people might accept his views after 
explanation. (36) 
Based on the 'base-strengthening and advance-west' principle, the conclusions of the 
DPP's 1998 China policy symposium summed up three points (37): 
Firstly, the basic principles of the Taiwan-China two sided negotiation were 'opposing 
negotiating with China under the one China principle': 'Taiwan's sovereignty should 
not become the subject of the cross-Straits negotiation'. 
Secondly, on the exchanges between Taiwan and China, the DPP reached a consensus 
on 'creating the two sides exchanges in many ways', 'diversifying the topics of 
negotiation', 'adding the channels of talking and negotiating machinery', and 'the 
negotiating topics should not to be separated'. 
Thirdly, on the economic principle, the DPP had a consensus on 'raising the base-
strengthening and advance-west instead of the KMT's policy of'no hurry, be patient". 
4-3-3. Feedback and blind spots 
Looking back at the DPP's 1998 China policy symposium, it did not come to a really 
meaningful conclusion on its Mainland China policy, and did not work out a reliable 
China policy after a three days meeting either, but it achieved a positive effect for the 
DPP's future development. 
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Firstly, after the three days meeting, the DPP's stereo-typed image 'just with 
doctrinairism, but without any idea on China policy' had changed a lot in the eyes of the 
public. People started to doubt whether the KMT's Mainland China policy was reliable 
or not. (38) Even some mainland Chinese scholars like Shu Fu-tong, Professor of 
Taiwan Research Department at Beijing University, said 'the DPP's debating of its 
China policy was through a democratic process, it had a positive effect in it. The 
Mainland China's department of Taiwanese affairs has to enhance communications with 
the factions of the DPP ' (39) 
Secondly, the DPP created a new possibility in processing the different views within the 
party at the meeting. They used rational debating instead of vicious struggles among the 
different factions. The DPP demonstrated good political communicating skills to the 
Taiwanese society, especially as since the foundation of the DPP in 1986, there had 
been many arguments along with the development of the party caused by the factions' 
struggles. Undoubtedly, this was a milestone in the DPP's history which processed a 
successful rational and open debate. 
Thirdly, the DPP's Mainland China policy debate stimulated its competitors, the KMT 
and the New Party, to re-consider their Mainland China policy. Some KMT's members 
wished to make the party's ambiguous China policy clearer. The New Party wanted to 
re-consider the party's China policy, going to far as having some members raised the 
new idea of 'one China, two states', which was a big mutation in the New Party's 
position of reunification. (40) 
Although, in general, the DPP's 1998 China policy debate gained some positive 
feedback from the public, there remained some blind spots which needed breaking 
through, the main one being the DPP's insistence on Taiwanese independence. 
Because of its lack of faith in China and its insistence on the party's Taiwanese 
independence platform, there was no argument over the political topic of Taiwan's 
sovereign independence in the DPP. It is inconceivable for the DPP to treat Taiwan's 
sovereignty as a subject of negotiation. In the DPP, the notion of 'Taiwan's sovereignty 
independence' is immoveable and can not be challenged. When the party's heavy 
weight Legislator Shih Ming-teh introduced the possibility that the two sides of the 
Taiwan Straits could organise a 'Greater Chinese Common Wealth' to the DPP in the 
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China policy symposium, he immediately became the target of attacks. It was clear that 
the DPP's position on the issue of Taiwanese sovereignty is not flexible. (41) 
For Beijing too, the idea that 'Taiwan is a part of China' is non-negotiable. The DPP 
and Beijing almost have no chance to have talks with each other i f the two sides can not 
make a concession on their insistences. I f the DPP can not create a space for negotiation 
with Beijing, even i f it introduces an official China policy to the Taiwanese people, the 
policy remains but a castle in the air. 
Now, the view that direct communication with China should be avoided is shed by most 
members of the DPP. By adopting such a position, the DPP's approach to China policy 
seems to be based on a frame of 'no China exists'. For example, the main theme of the 
1998 China policy symposium was 'the effect of the Post-Cold War order of 
international politics on Taiwan-China cross-Straits relations'. Yet almost no faction 
gave a clear statement that was relevant to China's internal affairs. The debating was 
wishful thinking. Because of the DPP's obstinate position and unwillingness to face the 
reality of China, they did not touch the issues concerning the two sides' international 
spaces and the competition on foreign relations; they set the precondition that 
'Taiwanese sovereignty can not to be raised as a negotiating subject', which is instead 
impossible for Beijing to accept. A China policy which has no 'China' in it remains like 
a political announcement. A China policy without a real plan of action could be a 
catastrophe for the DPP and for the 22 million Taiwanese people. 
Moreover, the approach of the DPP to the China policy is constrained by its 
departmentalism. The title 'China policy' used in the symposium conveyed a clear 
signal that the Taiwanese position is opposed to the Chinese position, which was an 
extension of the DPP's view on Taiwanese independence. This means that a talk 
between the DPP and China is simply out of question. There is a fear that the DPP's 
China policy can only function as a political announcement but not as a real action. (42) 
On examining Taiwan's developing situation, the DPP's analysis lacked understanding 
of economics and industry especially. In the debates, there were no discussions on the 
factors of Taiwan's economic development in the past; for example, what have been the 
effects on Taiwan's economics of the long-lasted opposition between the two sides of 
the Taiwan Straits? what wi l l be the different effects on the cross-Straits relations of the 
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different selected policies in the future? (43) Most discussions were concerned with 
debating matters like 'Taiwan needs to do this or that....', 'Taiwan should to do this or 
that....', but there was no argument providing real evidence, and the process and the 
conclusion of the debates were both too rough. The so-called 'advance-west boldly' and 
'base-strengthening and advance-west gradually', or 'base-strengthening and advance-
west' policies resemble a game of philology with little meaningful reality. 
On its judgement of the international situation, the DPP's view was also too narrow-
minded. It seems that the different views on the international situation did not matter to 
the DPP's factions; rather they focused on the US as the only international factor which 
could affect the cross-Straits relations. It seems that it did not occur to the DPP that the 
views and actions of China, Japan, Russia, and also of all the notions around the Pacific 
and in Asia wi l l have very important effects on the cross-Straits relations. (44) 
Altogether, there were numerous of blind spots in the DPP's 1998 China policy 
symposium, fully reflecting traces of political announcements and struggles among the 
factions. However, this was the first time that the DPP stepped foot on the area of the 
cross-Straits affairs and faced the cross-Straits reality. Balancing gains and losses, the 
DPP gained more than it lost, because it demonstrated good political communicating 
skills. However, it took the DPP too long to set up a reliable cross-Straits policy. 
4-4. Conclusion 
Basically, the factional fight within the DPP has always mainly happened between the 
Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction; this is reflected in political ideologies, 
radical Taiwanese independence group and moderate self-determinative group, since the 
foundation of the party in 1986. Traditionally, only the Formosa Faction and the New 
Tide Faction try to work out the mainland policy. Generally speaking, the Formosa 
Faction resembles an interest group, it is not solidly organised, and its political ideology 
is ambiguous. Individual views within the faction differ greatly. The representative 
opinions tend to be the main leaders'— Huang Hsin-chieh, Hsu Hsin-liang, Chang 
Chun-hong, Julian J. Kuo, and Chen Chung-hsin. The New Tide Faction is better 
organised than the Formosa Faction. Their political ideology is clearer and individual 
views within the faction are close. (45) 
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The arguments between the two main factions in the DPP can be classified into four 
main points. 
The first argument is about the background and the developmental motivation of 
Taiwan's independent consciousness. 
In the Formosa Faction's view, firstly, the formation of Taiwan's independent 
consciousness originates from its past, for instance from the previously unhappy 
experience of unification with Mainland China, in 1945. After the 228 Incident, 
Taiwan's independent consciousness grew among native Taiwanese people. Secondly, 
the ruling KMT had delayed the process of political reform in Taiwan by using the 
sovereignty of China as an excuse. Furthermore, the 'Tienanmen Square Incident' 
strengthened the Taiwanese people's wish to gain independence. (46) In other words, 
the early years of Taiwan's independent consciousness relate to an anti-KMT and an 
anti-Chinese consciousness. Yet, the recent renewal in Taiwan's independent 
consciousness was caused by the frustration of democratic reform and the fear of 
Beijing's military threat. (47) 
In the New Tide Faction's view, firstly, the ruling regimes in the history of Taiwan all 
came from outside. Their purpose was colonial, and the ruling policies were oppressing. 
The Chinese KMT regime's feudalistic ideas were not compatible with Taiwan, which 
had modernised during Japanese ruling. Therefore, the 228 Incident was historically 
inevitable. (48) Hence, the New Tide Faction considers that the formation of Taiwan's 
independent consciousness springs from long term considerations in the evolution of 
Taiwan's history. Taiwanese people wants to break off the relations with the Chinese 
culture and historical control, and set their own avenue to development. This view is 
close to 'Taiwanese Nationalism'. (49) Secondly, the mainlanders composed the KMT. 
Its ruling policy was authoritarianism, which came from China. Based on the principle 
of 'people's sovereignty', the ROC's system should be given up, and a new political 
order suiting the reality of Taiwan should be established. (50) Thirdly, it considers that 
the KMT's 'one China' policy means fighting for China's sovereignty with the CCP. 
Taiwan would thus be suppressed by the PRC in the international community. I f Taiwan 
advocates 'one China, one Taiwan' policy instead, it may help releasing the tension 
existing in the cross-Straits relations. 
77 
The second argument is about the priority between 'Democracy' and 'Independence'. 
The Formosa Faction considers making effort for a democratic reform. It hopes to 
achieve the building of an independent country through amending the ROC's 
constitutional system. The Taiwanese democratic movement should use self-governance 
and democracy as content of its policy. I f it gains independence only but neglects 
democracy, the aim of independence can be achieved through democracy; yet 
independence does not entail democracy. Therefore, the Formosa Faction considers the 
priority at this stage is to be the ruling of the regime, so that it can then re-establish 
sovereignty. 
In the New Tide Faction's view, Taiwanese democracy can only be achieved via 
sovereignty. The mission of Taiwanese independence should therefore be completed 
first. 
The third argument is on the mainland policy. 
In the New Tide Faction's consideration, 'sovereignty' takes priority over the 'regime'. 
That is why the faction does it best to advocate Taiwanese independence. In their 
opinion: (51) 
While China has not completed their mission of modernisation, Beijing has no power to 
attack Taiwan. Time is limited, but this remains the best time for advocating Taiwanese 
independence. In other words, the New Tide Faction considers that i f Beijing owns 
enough power, even i f Taiwan does not announce its independence, it would still attack 
Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwan should announce its independence before Beijing's power 
has been established, thus for concretising its international status. (52) 
In the Formosa Faction's consideration, time is on the side of 'Taiwan residents' self-
determination'. Since the modernisation of China has been launched, Taiwan has a 
chance to unite with Hong Kong and the seashore provinces of China to affect Beijing's 
policy making. It wishes for the development of China's society; economic would then 
generate political development. Taiwan could use the chance to get involved in China's 
internal politics and use its contradiction to protect Taiwan's security and independence. 
(53) Based on the approach above, the Formosa Faction considers that Taiwan's 
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economic developing strategy is encouraging cross-Straits economic exchanges and 
investment in Mainland China, thus transforming Taiwan's economic power into the 
political influence. (54) 
The fourth argument is about the cross-Straits economic exchanges and investments. 
The Formosa Faction considers that the Taiwan's enterprise to go west is inevitable. By 
expanding the cross-Straits exchanges, and letting the economics of the two sides 
depend more on each other, Taiwan's security would gain more safeguards. This is the 
best way to set the issue of 'Taiwanese people's self-determination' intemationalisation. 
They also suggest that the two sides can learn from the experience of the EEC's 
integration. In a first step, Taiwan can unite with Singapore, Hong Kong, and China's 
seashore provinces to build a 'South China Sea Economic Community'. In a second 
step, Taiwan may then invite Japan and China to join the group to build an 'East Asian 
Economic Community' or an 'Asian Economic Community'. They wish that this kind 
of economic community could finally be transformed into a political community, which, 
like the EEC, would be transformed from a confederation into a federal state. (55) 
Therefore, the main points of the Formosa Faction's cross-Straits economic and trade 
policy are: (56) 
1) The two sides of the Taiwan Straits should for the time-being shelve the problems 
which cannot be solved in the short term, for example, the problem of sovereignty; 2) 
Given that the economic and trade exchanges cannot be stopped, the two sides need not 
limit their activities by policies or laws; 3) Taiwan's security has priority in the 
mainland policy. Yet in the era of the Post-Cold War, security is not only for defence, 
but also a need for deepening the dependence between the two sides; 4) Taiwan's 
capital should unite with the world's and China's capitals, and the Chinese powerful 
organisations (including central government, local governments, and state-owned 
companies) to invest in Mainland China; 5) Taiwan should use its merits, and its 
historical, cultural, and linguistic ties with the mainland in order to play bridging role 
between international enterprises and China. 
The New Tide Faction opposes the Formosa Faction's 'advance-west' policy. In their 
view, Taiwan's investment would help the Chinese economic reform; at the same time, 
i f Taiwan's economics over-depend on the China, this would endanger the force of 
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Taiwanese independence. The faction objects to the formation of an economic circle 
which would include Taiwan and China's seashore provinces. It considers that this idea 
to 'underestimate' the competitive relations between the two sides and to 'overestimate' 
the opinions on how to solve the Taiwan problem is different within the CCP. (57) 
Moreover, the Formosa Faction wanting to transplant the EEC experience is also 
criticised by the New Tide Faction. Firstly, Beijing's policy of 'one country, two 
systems' treats Taiwan as a province of China, whereas the members of the EEC are 
independent sovereign countries. Secondly, the political and economic situations and 
relations among the European countries are very similar and close, whereas the two 
sides of the Taiwan Straits are rather different. Thirdly, the European countries have 
integrated a community that can benefit all its members, whereas Taiwan and China do 
not share common benefits at this moment. (58) They stress that making a mainland 
policy should always put Taiwan's national security in the foreground, and secondly it 
should maintain Taiwan's economic interests. (59) 
There are at least four different views on Mainland China policy between the Formosa 
Faction and the New Tide Faction. Yet they do have a common consensus. As we can 
see from the process of the formation of the party's Mainland China policy, the intensity 
of the Taiwanese independence movement has grown stronger. The Formosa Faction's 
'exact Taiwan independence' policy is being swallowed by the New Tide's 'new nation' 
policy step by step. The party's mainland policy therefore comes closer to the New Tide 
Faction's approach. 
Firstly, on the political affairs, the party uses 'one China, one Taiwan' as the framework 
of the cross-Straits relations. They advocate building a 'Republic of Taiwan' through 
plebiscite. They do not oppose the two sides of the Taiwan Straits in order to take the 
negotiation on matters of a business nature, but they object to the 'one China' principle. 
Secondly, the party considers internationalising the Taiwan problem, using the 'one 
China, one Taiwan' policy as a strategy to seek a living space in the international 
community. Both factions oppose the 'one China' policy. They advocate entering 
international organisations under the title of Taiwan. They disagree with using the title 
of ROC, which bears the implicit meaning of China's sovereignty. They also advocate 
the two sides signing a 'treaty of reciprocal non-aggression'. 
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Thirdly, the DPP advocates abolishing The National Unification Council from the ROC 
government. They object to the status of unification. Yet, i f the title of The National 
Unification Council is changed into a neutral one, then the DPP would accept it. 
Members of the organisations taking the responsibility of the mainland affairs, such as 
the SEF and the Mainland Affairs Council, should be selected on the principle of 
proportional representation, which based on the party's force. 
Fourthly, both factions advocate the liberalisation and internationalisation of Taiwan's 
economics, and wish to see international forces introduced in order to strengthen 
Taiwan's security. They both oppose introduce the mainland's workers into Taiwan. (60) 
The two sides of the Taiwan Straits should sign an agreement to protect activities 
involving investment. 
Fifthly, the cross-Straits affairs should be managed under the structure of the 
international law. The party does not object to exchanges between the Taiwan Straits 
under the condition that Taiwan's security be protected. 
From the above analyses, we can see that the main difference between the Formosa and 
the New Tide resides in the issue over the cross-Straits economic and trade relations. 
The two factions have different views on the three-links, direct-shipping, and investing 
in the Chinese market. (61) These differences originate in the different bases for their 
assumptions on the cross-Straits relations. I f the voice of 'Taiwan independence' gets 
louder, economic nationalism may surpass economic liberalism. The party's position 
may come close to limit the cross-Straits exchanges. Yet, as Taiwanese businessmen go 
to invest in the Chinese market more and more, working out a balance between the 
political affairs and the economic affairs wi l l be likely to become a big issue for the 
DPP. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
On 28 th September 1986, Taiwan's opposition broke the ban on the formation of new 
political parties, and they formally established the Democratic Progressive Party. In 
November of the same year, the DPP adopted 'the future of Taiwan should be decided 
by the residents of Taiwan' as a slogan into the party platform. In November 1987, the 
2 n d National Congress of the party adopted the resolution that the 'Taiwanese people 
have the right to stand for Taiwanese independence'. In April 1988, the DPP adopted 
'417 resolution' which stands for 'Taiwan's sovereign independence'. Moreover, it 
proclaimed that the DPP would advocate Taiwan's independence under the situation of 
'Four Ifs'. In October 1990, the DPP adopted '1007 resolution' which proclaimed 'Our 
country's sovereignty does not include the territories of the People's Republic of China 
and People's Republic of Mongolia'. In August 1991, the independent activists were 
inspired by international factors, such as the break-up of the Soviet Union. The DPP 
united with the other opposition forces to hold a People's Conference to institute a 
Constitution which was adopted as that of the 'Republic of Taiwan'. In October of the 
same year, the party's 5 t h National Congress adopted as their aim 'to build an 
independent sovereign Republic of Taiwan'. 
From the process of the formulation of the DPP's party platform or resolutions, we can 
discover that the DPP's intention of building a new nation has become more and more 
clear. This intention of Taiwanese independence affected the making of the party's 
Mainland China policy. The first step is to define the cross-Straits relations under the 
framework of 'one China, one Taiwan', especially after the article: 'Building an 
independent sovereign Republic of Taiwan' was written into the party platform, the 
framework of 'one China, one Taiwan' has been confirmed. It has become the DPP's 
guideline of Mainland China policy. 
Briefly, the DPP criticises both the KMT's and the CCP's policies on the cross-Straits 
relations. The KMT's status of Chinese nationalism and unification and the CCP's 
status of proclaiming sovereignty over Taiwan are both unrealistic. The DPP considers 
that its Mainland China policy is to admit both the communist regime as the sole legal 
authority in China. The policy can deepen the comprehension of the real situation 
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between the Taiwan Straits. (1) 
Indeed, 'Taiwanese independence' is the most sensitive issue across the Taiwan Straits. 
The CCP has set five preconditions about its using force to attack Taiwan. One of them 
is 'Proclamation of Taiwan as an independent nation'. (See the chapter of Introduction) 
On the KMT's status, it wants to maintain its ruling position in Taiwan, so to maintain 
the present situation of 'one country, two political entities' between the Taiwan Straits 
is in accordance with its needs. Any movement that attempt to change the present 
situation between the straits including to proclaim independence would hurt the ruling 
position of the KMT. 
In the process of expanding its political force, the DPP has been trying to find a balance 
between 'establishing an independent country' and 'becoming the ruling party'. In fact, 
the DPP has started to 'soften' its theme of 'Taiwanese independence'. In the analysis 
of chapter 3, we can realise that, the radical view of Taiwanese independence has been 
removed gradually from the majority view. The establishment of the TAIP and the 
declaration that is presented by the younger generation of the DPP both indicate that 
Taiwanese independence would not be the DPP's political aim at least at this moment. 
(See Chapter 3) 
5-1. The finding of the research 
In the beginning of this work, I have raised the argument that because the DPP's present 
political aim is to become the ruling party in Taiwan, it wi l l adjust its Taiwanese 
independence stand, and its Mainland China policy wi l l become more flexible to match 
the cross-Straits political reality. 
In the first chapter 'The Rise of the DPP', I introduced the foundation of the DPP and 
the development of the political opposition movement in Taiwan. During this time, the 
independence consciousness was formed by the ruling KMT's misgovernment. The 
occurrence of the 228 Incident in 1947 was a very important factor in the development 
of the Taiwan Independence Movement. Later, the KMT opened the door to political 
participation. The opposition have used the opportunity of participating in elections to 
expand their forces. Before 1986, the opposition used the title of 'Tangwai' to unite 
their forces. In 1986, the main characters of the opposition formed the DPP, which is 
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the first native opposition political party in Taiwan since 1949. 
The DPP is the continuation of the Tangwai political opposition movement. It has used 
its formal title while expanding its political influence since 1986. The political reform 
started at President Chiang Ching-kuo's later years. His policies of 'Taiwanisation' and 
'allowing Taiwanese residents to visit their relatives on the mainland' has produced 
changes to the political picture of Taiwan - the Taiwanese consciousness in Taiwan has 
been increasing, and the relations between the Taiwan Straits has improved. The DPP's 
political force is growing rapidly because Taiwanese identity in Taiwan has increased; 
at the same time, the exchanges between the Straits increased more rapid than before. 
The DPP wants to complete the political aim of taking the place of the ruling KMT, but 
it still needs to take care of the development of the cross-Straits reality. As a political 
dream, the independence of Taiwan is the ultimate goal of the DPP, but when and how 
to achieve this is of vital importance. 
The relationship between the factions within the DPP is a very important factor in 
effecting its Mainland China policy and its future. In the second chapter 'The Factions 
in the DPP', I introduced the factions in the party, their history, and how they work in 
the party. The DPP is composed of many different political ideologies, the struggles 
within the party having limited themselves to face the external political circumstances. 
As regards internal political affairs, the different factions can be united in an anti-KMT 
stance. But to face the PRC, the strategies are variable. The Formosa Faction tends 
towards negotiating with the PRC, but the New Tide Faction insists on building an 
official independent state in Taiwan. 
According to the analysis in chapter 2, the competition between the Formosa Faction 
and the New Tide Faction is the main theme of the party's development. After the Fifth 
National Congress, the situation of multi-factional leading appeared and was based on 
the competition between Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction. Not only the 
organisations of the factions but also the political views and political philosophies were 
changed during the process of the DPP's development. But it appears that the factions 
of the party have all cut back on their political attitudes. In a general view, the Formosa 
Faction's stand has moved closer to the KMT's; the New Tide Faction's stand has 
moved to the Formosa Faction's; the World United Formosans for Independence tried 
to progress by following New Tide Faction's model; Warfare State Alliance and the 
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Justice Alliance both tried to survive under the pressure of other factions. The idea of 
'reform within the system' that advocated by the Formosa Faction and Kang or Supra-
Factions was also accepted by the other factions. For example, the radical factions such 
as the New Tide Faction and the World United Formosans for Independence have both 
given up the revolutionary line in proclaiming the establishment of a new independent 
country on Taiwan. 
In the third chapter 'The Formulation of the DPP's Mainland China Policy', I 
introduced the history of the formulation of the DPP's Mainland China policy, and gave 
the background of the process of its policy-making. I divided the process of the 
development of the party's platform into three parts: 1) the period of self-determination 
by the residents of Taiwan; 2) the period of claiming the independence of Taiwanese 
sovereignty; and 3) the period of calling for the establishment of an independent state of 
Taiwan. It showed the development of the policy-making. In the first step, the situation 
was still unclear; in the second step, the party's attitude tended to a 'quasi-two states 
and two governments' policy; and eventually to the 'two-states and two-governments' 
policy. 
Reviewing the discussions in chapter 3, relationship between the factions with in the 
DPP; its party platform; the policy-making the mainland policy; and the views on 
constitutional reform can be summed up into following points: 
1. During the three periods of the development of the DPP's Mainland China policy 
mentioned above, and because of the rise of the force of independence activists, the 
party's mainland policy has tended to be conservative, and the defining relationship 
gradually evolved towards 'one China, one Taiwan'. 
2. Examining all the processes of the development of the DPP's party platform and its 
resolutions, it became clear that the concept of self-determination was changing 
alongside the political power balance inside the DPP, and later it promoted the view of 
pro-independence which was rising gradually in the party. 
3. Within the political power structure inside the DPP, some people who advocated 
unification left the party for different reasons. This made the position of those 
advocating unification progressively more weak, until finally the power of pro-
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independence views could not be restricted in the party. 
4. The three Resolutions ('Taiwanese people have the right to pursue Taiwan's 
independence', '417 resolution', and '1007 resolution') have special meanings for the 
DPP's stand for independence. On the one hand, the policy-making of the party was 
usually paralysed by factional disagreements. On the other hand, because Huang Hsin-
chieh and Chang Chun-hong reintegrated and reorganised the Formosa Faction, and 
gained the help from the Progress Faction. The force of the Formosa Faction was 
growing rapidly. Because of the Formosa Faction's opposition and the middle Factions' 
collaboration, the party deferred the process of writing the articles of 'Taiwanese 
independence' into the party platform. This also reduced the possibility of conflicts over 
the problem of Taiwan's sovereignty between the KMT and the DPP. 
5. The balance of forces between the factions within the party affected the development 
of policy. The range of influences can be judged by examining the structure of the 
'Mainland China Policy Study Group'. The number of seats for individual factions was 
allocated according to the power of the faction. 
6. During a certain period of time, in the design of the DPP's mainland policy, the main 
ideas usually came from the strongest faction, and then became the 'consensus' of the 
whole party. But it does not mean that the party's policy totally revealed the wil l of the 
main stream faction. Consequently, after competing, the process of any policy making 
involved a series of 'decision making' by the factions. 
7. The argument about the issue of policy usually related to political power. Factions 
sometime pursued power by changing their political theme, and accepting other 
faction's views as the condition for exchange, like the case of the passing of the 
'Taiwan independence platform', or, the main factions sometimes tried to avoid 
becoming overheated causing conflict , which could cause the break-up of the party. 
They would accept an opponent's opinion temporarily and then delay the 
implementation, like the setting up of the CTSDVI. 
8. Although different factions have different views on policy making, this does not 
mean that all their members were unified under a consensus on policy-making. In 
addition, under special circumstances, different factions could share the same political 
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view with one another. Sometimes they even would co-operate with the others 
temporarily, but it did not mean that all of them would unite. The rule was that even i f 
different factions could share the same political opinion as others, they would still want 
to share political power to fit their own group's benefit. 
The fourth chapter is 'The DPP's China Policy Symposium in 1998'. The DPP's 1998 
China policy symposium was the first time the party tried to raise an official Mainland 
China policy. It was also the first time for the different factions of the party to debate 
and challenge the other's views. It was a milestone in the history of the DPP. 
After its victory in the 1997 local elections, many people believe that the DPP is 
heading towards becoming the governing party of the central government of Taiwan. 
According to the political environment, the KMT's impetus is decreasing, the DPP's 
influence is increasing. The DPP has to prepare thoroughly to be able to take the KMT's 
ruling position. To present their Mainland China policy is one of the most important 
issues for the party. 
Basically, the factional fight within the DPP has mainly happened between the Formosa 
Faction and the New Tide Faction, also the two ideologies of political lines - the radical 
Taiwanese independence group and the moderate self-determinative group, since the 
foundation of the party in 1986. Traditionally only the Formosa Faction and the New 
Tide Faction tried to work out their the mainland policy. 
The arguments between the two main factions in the DPP can be classified into four 
main points: 1): the background and the developmental motivation of Taiwanese 
independent consciousness; 2): the priority between 'democracy' and 'independence'; 
3): the mainland policy; 4): the cross-Straits economic exchanges and investments. 
The Formosa Faction's position is close to accepting the present situation regarding the 
Taiwan Straits. They advocate to increase the exchanges between the straits. Their 
attitude on the national identity tends to admit the system of the ROC, Taiwan is an 
independent country de facto. But the New Tide Faction considers national security of 
Taiwan the most important issue, so does not encourage the exchanges between the 
straits to increase too rapidly. They consider that Taiwan is not completely independent 
de jure. The establishment of an official Republic of Taiwan is the political aim that 
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leaves room for doubt for the DPP. But the New Tide Faction has given up the 
revolutionary line, and accepts completion of the mission for political reform under the 
present political system of the ROC. 
To sum up, even i f the DPP inherits the Tangwai's anti-Chinese consciousness, later 
writing the Taiwanese independence article into their party platform, and would 
therefore become a 'Taiwanese independence party'. As for becoming the ruling party 
in Taiwan, the DPP has noticed the reality across the Taiwan Straits, it has softened its 
insistence on Taiwanese independence. 'Taiwanese independence' is still a political aim 
of the DPP, but it is indeed not its priority anymore. 
5-2. The future development of the DPP's Mainland China policy 
Since, the DPP's stand on the cross-Straits relations has been confirmed as 'one China, 
one Taiwan', it has put the DPP itself into a dilemma. At home, the people still have the 
worry of the Taiwan independent status. On the relations between the Taiwan Straits, 
the DPP's Mainland China policy is attacked from both sides of the CCP's 'one 
country, two systems' and the KMT's 'one China, two equal political entities'. But, in 
the framework of the relation between the Taiwan Straits, the DPP could become the 
force assisting the KMT on maintaining the present status of Taiwan. The KMT would 
accompany the DPP to negotiate with the CCP for rejecting the CCP's negotiating 
proposal of 'party to party'. At the same time, the DPP also could become the CCP's 
factor for promoting three-links in the game between the Straits. The DPP would be the 
balance force between the KMT and the CCP. (2) Therefore, analysing the DPP's 
Mainland China policy from the angle of its political position, it wil l insist its 'one 
Taiwan, one China' policy before becoming the ruling party of Taiwan. Firstly, because 
'one Taiwan, one China' is totally different to the KMT's policy. Even i f other political 
ideas of the DPP are absorbed by the KMT, it can still maintain the Taiwan independent 
stand. Secondly, since the KMT's official Mainland China policy is to unify with the 
mainland, the DPP temporarily stands for independence which is a useful card to 
confront Beijing's 'one China' stand in the cross-Straits competitive game. 
The cross-Straits exchanges have become more and more frequent. The DPP's China 
policy has to include business natural and functional matters. I f the DPP wants to show 
the difference of its China policy from the KMT's, insistence on its 'one Taiwan, one 
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China' stand is necessary in the stage before setting up the regime. Therefore, before the 
DPP takes the place of the KMT's ruling position, it wi l l maintain its 'one Taiwan, one 
China' stand. 
But the DPP's insistence on 'one China, one Taiwan' policy has also confused it. The 
DPP's task at the present stage is to become the ruling party. Hsu Hsin-liang has even 
said with lofty aspiration, 'the DPP wil l become the ruling party before the 21 s t 
century.' Since it lost in the 1998 Legislative elections, the last hope for it wi l l be in the 
2000 presidential election. But Hsu has predicted earlier results as well, ' i f the DPP can 
not present a clear statement on national security, it wi l l not win the 1998 Legislative 
elections and 2000 presidential elections.' (3) Hsu stressed i f Taiwanese people do not 
trust the DPP with the capability to take the responsibility for national security, the DPP 
wil l forever be an opposition party. (4) Hence the DPP needs to take part in a coalition 
government to win the people's confidence, and to explain again the party's Taiwan 
independence platform to reduce the possibility of the cross-Straits conflict. 
The development of the DPP's China policy in the future could tend two ways. Firstly, 
i f the exchanges across the Taiwan Straits increases, and Beijing reduces its hostility, 
the DPP's stand of 'one Taiwan, one China' wi l l become more flexible, and it would 
keep on developing a more perfect China policy. Secondly, i f the exchanges across the 
Taiwan Straits decreases, and Beijing increases the force of threatening to Taipei, the 
DPP's stand of 'one Taiwan, one China' policy wil l be more radical, even though it 
would not turn its back on the business affairs. (5) 
As for the sections referring to business nature and function in its China policy, it would 
tend to the developments as follows: 
1. The organisation, which is in charge of China policy of the DPP, would gradually 
become a permanent one. 
The DPP's organisation, which was in charge of China policy came into being caused 
by the variable demand. It normally was an informal one. For example, the 'China 
Policy Research Team' (1987 and 1988), the 'China Policy Study Team' (1992), the 
'Cross-Straits Relations Team' (March 1993), and the 'Team of Chinese Affairs' 
(October 1993) were all temporary organisations. Then in December 1993, the 
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'Committee of Chinese Affairs' became a formal organisation which was in charge of 
the work of China policy in the DPP. Now the title of it has been changed into the 
'Department of Chinese Affairs' up till the present day. (6) 
2. The level of DPP contact with Mainland China wil l go higher gradually. 
The DPP's Central Standing Committee made a resolution which 'does not oppose' 
members of the party visiting Mainland China personally in 1988. The DPP's National 
Assembly Delegates Group made a resolution and encouraged members of the party to 
visit Mainland China in person. In March 1993, to deal with the Koo-Wang talks, the 
party made a further resolution which 'does not prohibit' its members to visit Mainland 
China personally. Moreover in July 1993, it allowed the Welfare State Alliance to visit 
Mainland China. (7) 
However, the possibility of the DPP using its formal title to visit the mainland is very 
unlikely. (8) On one hand, it is for maintaining its strong position for criticising the 
contacts or talks between the KMT and the CCP, and reduce the speed of the cross-
Straits exchanges. On the other hand, Beijing's stand at present is they just want to 
contact the DPP's member personally. I f the DPP still insists on its Taiwanese 
independence stand, Beijing would not accept the formal mission of the party. In fact, 
before the 'Taiwan independence platform' was adopted, Beijing had to deal with the 
DPP or the other radical independence groups on their own merits. Beijing has sought 
Formosa Faction's favour. They wished to unite with the Formosa Faction to suppress 
the New Tide Faction. But Beijing's leaders also wished to change New Tide Faction 
and other radical independence groups' attitudes. At the same time, they wished to build 
further relations with New Tide Faction. (9) However, 'Taiwan independence platform' 
has been adopted by the party in 1991, in the long term Beijing would refuse to 
communicate with the leaders of the DPP. And putting the members of the DPP's 
Central Standing Committee onto the 'black list', does not allow them to visit the 
mainland. (10) 
3. Participating in the formal process of policy making and the organisation, which is in 
charge of the cross-Straits affairs actively. 
4. The level of making Mainland China policy wi l l tend to be wider and more accurate. 
92 
5. Maintaining the present situation of the cross-Straits business, natural and functional 
exchanges, would not regress. 
The Formosa Faction's attitude on the cross-Straits exchanges usually has an open 
mind. The Welfare Alliance's attitude has come closer to the Formosa's after visiting 
the mainland. Meriting attention, the radical legislators of the DPP have presented their 
'The Political Outlines of Mainland China Policy' with an attitude which is close to 
Formosa's and the Welfare Alliance's views. (11) Hence, the DPP's stand on the cross-
Straits exchanges would not stay firmly in place. 
5-3. Effects on the cross-Straits relations under the structure of 'one Taiwan, one 
China' 
On 2 n d December 1989, several elections took place in Taiwan. They were the elections 
of the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan Provincial Assembly, Taipei and Kaohsiung city 
councils, and county and city mayors. 
Just before the campaign period started, 32 DPP candidates belonging to the New Tide 
Faction, which advocated or supported Taiwanese independence, announced the 
formation of the 'New Country Alliance' and called for a new constitution and the 
election by Taiwan's electorate of all members of Taiwan's elected bodies in 
government. This pushed the independence issue further to the forefront of the 
campaign and underscored the challenge of the issue to the government and the KMT -
and to Beijing. (12) On the eve of the elections (from 27 t h October to 30 th November), 
Beijing strongly attacked the Taiwanese independence stand through its propaganda 
teams for at least 8 times. (13) From March to October 1991, Beijing had spoken of 
'military attack against Taiwan' 17 times, 3 times a month on average, but in only half a 
month just after the DPP adopted the Taiwanese independence article for its platform, 
Beijing mentioned 'military attack against Taiwan' 6 times. (14) This shows that the 
DPP's Taiwanese independence speech had caused Beijing's hostility. It would harm 
the cross-Straits relations. 
The DPP's Taiwanese independence speech would cause the raising of the cross-Straits 
conflicts. But in the Taiwanese people's consideration, Beijing's unreasonable actions 
which harmed the cross-Straits peace would be more serious than the Taiwanese 
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independence appeal. For example, 29% of the Taiwanese people thought that the two 
sides of the Taiwan Straits had hostility to each other when the DPP adopted the '1007 
resolution'. (15) But 'before Tienanmen Square Incident took place' (in 1989) were 
42%; 'after Tienanmen Square Incident took place' were 52%; 'the first Chiu-Tang talk' 
were 35% (16); Beijing presented 'Taiwan Problem and China's reunification White 
Paper' were 42%. (17) Therefore, general comments on the whole situation of the 
Taiwan Straits, even though the DPP's Taiwan independent stand could raise the 
hostility of the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. But Beijing's actions would be the most 
important factor on whether the cross-Straits relations lead to moderation or conflict. 
However, the parts of the DPP's China policy which involve the natural and functional 
cross-Straits business matters wi l l encourage moderation in cross-Straits relations. For 
example, it advocated 'stop the cross-Straits opposition, and realise the two-sides 
peaceful competition', but it did not mention the problems of sovereignty and politics. 
Moreover, its Mainland China policy which was adopted in 1987 and 1989, advocated 
that it should 'spread out the exchanges of academic, cultural, sports, and technical 
skills, and direct transportation, telecommunications, and investment links actively and 
with initiative'. Then in the 1990 'Democratic Great Charter', it also advocated the 
encouragement of the exchanges in the economic, cultural, academic, religious, and 
sporting fields. The DPP has used 'one China, one Taiwan' to define the cross-Straits 
relations gradually. But in advocating the realisation of restrictions on the cross-Straits 
exchanges, permitting the people of two sides to visit each other freely, and creating 
equal and beneficial relations, the DPP would be helpful in reducing the tenseness of the 
cross-Straits relations. 
5-4. Rethink the DPP's Mainland China policy 
The DPP's definition of 'one China' is the 'People's Republic of China', but not the 
'Republic of China' with the central government in Taipei. The People's Republic of 
China whose capital in Beijing is the sole legal ruling government of China has been a 
consensus in international society. The PRC, instead of the ROC, has become China's 
legal regime since 1949. The CCP is the sole ruling party of China. (18) Therefore ROC 
has lost its legality, the ROC on Taiwan is like an international orphan, a new name -
'Taiwan' is quite meaningful. A new national title of 'Taiwan' is a clearer and proper 
political appellation than 'ROC. 
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In Beijing's thinking, there is no 'China problem' but only a 'Taiwan problem'. The 
'Taiwan problem' is a Chinese internal affair, (19) because it denies the legality of the 
ROC, and insists Taiwan is a part of China. International society accepts Beijing's 
status. Hence, using the title of Taiwan instead of ROC is not helpful for Taiwan itself 
to re-enter the international organisations. Moreover it may cause the danger of 
Beijing's military actions. 
The DPP advocates using the title of Taiwan to re-enter the international society, and to 
establish a 'Republic of Taiwan' through a plebiscite of Taiwan's residents. But could 
the DPP's idea come true? it is really a big problem. Beijing opposes Taiwanese 
independence, but sometime connives at Taiwan doing some international activities 
under the present political structure. I f Taiwan changes its political situation to build a 
'Republic of Taiwan', it might cause Beijing to blockade Taiwan's living space in 
international society. Under Beijing's overall political and economical attacks, is the 
situation for Taiwan better than today? It needs to ponder it deeply. 
Moreover, since the DPP defines the relations between Taiwan and Mainland China as 
an international relationship but not a domestic relationship. So it tries to divide the 
'Taiwan problem' from the framework of 'one China', and then make it an international 
affair. But to internationalise the 'Taiwan problem', Taiwan has to maintain its 
economic powers and combine the benefits of Taiwan and western countries together. 
As a result, the countries which have close beneficial ties with Taiwan would possibly 
share the pressure from Beijing. 
Moreover, China is on the road of progressing, especially in the area of economics. 
According to the World Bank statistics, in 1979, the PRC's GNP per capita was 
US$260, placing it 102nd on a list of 124 countries. (20) Deng Xiaoping has admitted 
this poverty by saying that 'we belong to the category of poor countries in this world'. 
(21) He told the leaders of the PRC that 'we should ponder the question: what have we 
really done for the people?' (22) At the same time, Deng seems to have understood that 
i f the PRC remains in poverty, the appeal of reunification with Taiwan would be less 
convincing and ultimately unsuccessful. He therefore pledges that the PRC wil l match 
Taiwan's thriving economy in the future. (23) The economic development of the PRC 
in a long term could generate an adverse situation for the ROC. As Beijing will become 
more wealthy in the future when - and i f - Beijing quadruples its annual GNP to 
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US$1,000 billion by the year 2000, (24) Deng has pointed out ' i f we allocate one 
percent of US$1,000 to national defence, that means $10 billion; five percent means $50 
billion. With $10 billion we could accomplish much, and it would be easy to upgrade 
our military equipment. (25) A more powerful PRC in terms of military strength would 
certainly become more difficult for Taiwan to resist i f Beijing decided to use force 
against Taiwan regardless of the cost. 
The above comment by Beijing's leader has, to some extent, revealed the connection 
between the PRC's economic development and Beijing's strategy to resolve the Taiwan 
problem. Whether Beijing can successfully achieve its ambitious goals of economic 
development remains to be seen. (26) This strategy combines both courting the 
Taiwanese and enhancing the PRC's capability and power to take over Taiwan by force. 
5-5. Condense the powers of the party 
The DPP's ideas of the mainland policy have exceeded the KMT's in the early days. 
(27) But it dropped behind the KMT later because of the struggles of different political 
lines within the party. For example, in October 1987, the DPP appealed to establish a 
'Chinese Affairs Department' in the central government. But the Executive Yuan has 
not established the Mainland Affairs Council ti l l January 1991. The Hsu Hsin-liang 
Office has also advocated giving up the old views which treated the CCP as a 
revolutionary group in 1990, and raised his ideas of advocating the two sides of the 
Taiwan Straits to give up the arguments about sovereignty for the time-being. The two 
sides could start their talks on the problems of exchange. But the KMT has not renewed 
the definition that the CCP was a revolutionary group until it ended in May 1991 when 
President Lee Teng-hui proclaimed the Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression 
of the Communist Rebellion had ended. Then on August 1993, the Mainland Affairs 
Council advocated 'promotion of the about Mainland China policy, and froze the 
arguments of sovereignty'.(28) 
Even though, the DPP's Mainland China policy had more progressive ideas than the 
KMT's, the radical Taiwan independent views raised later, then made its stand on 
mainland policy become conservative. (29) 
Lots of arguments on the party's political line have happened in the past few years. For 
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example, the former mayor of Taipei Chen Shui-bian opposed the former chairmen Shih 
Ming-teh's and Hsu Hsin-liang's 'Great Reconciliation, Great Coalition' ideas. (30) In 
1996, the radical independence advocators finally formed a new party - TAIP. In 1997, 
because of having different views on constitutional revision, the liberal scholars broke 
up with the DPP. More and more elite left the DPP. The former chairman Hsu Hsin-
liang proclaimed that he would not run as party chairman for a consecutive term under 
the pressure of the arguments on the party's political stance. 
The transformation of the DPP caused a great pain. The loss of the 1998 Legislative 
elections was a significant example of this, since the DPP has given up the anti-ROC 
political line and turned towards the electoral line instead. (31) To 'purify' the party's 
organisation would help the DPP to condense its strengths on attaining power. It is 
helpful for the party to condense them to face the challenges both from the internal and 
external political circumstances. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Percentage of votes won by KMT and non-KMT candidates in the elections for 
county magistrates, city mayors, and Taiwan Province Assembly members, prior to 
formation of the DPP. 
Offices County magistrates and city ma1 vors* 
Party affiliation KMT Non-KMT 
Seats & Votes won No. of seats % of seats % of votes No. of seats % of seats % of votes 
1954 19 91 72 2 10 28 
1957 20 95 65 1 5 35 
1960 19 91 72 2 10 28 
1963-1964 17 81 73 4 19 27 
1968 17 85 72 3 15 28 
1972 20 100 79 0 0 21 
1977 16 80 70 4 20 30 
1981 15 79 59 4 21 41 
1985 17 81 65 4 19 35 
Offices Taiwan Provincial Assembly members 
Seats & Votes won No. of seats % of seats % of votes No. of seats % of seats % of votes 
1954 48 84 69 9 16 31 
1957 53 80 68 13 20 32 
1960 58 80 65 15 21 35 
1963-1964 61 82 68 13 18 32 
1968 60 85 76 11 16 25 
1972 58 80 69 15 21 31 
1977 56 73 64 21 27 36 
1981 59 77 70 18 23 30 
1985 59 77 71 18 23 29 
Source: Republic of China Yearbook 1990-1991 
*Except Taipei & Kaohsiung cities 
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Table 2: Percentage of votes won by KMT and non-KMT candidates in the elections for 
legislators and National Assembly delegates, prior to formation of the DPP. 
Offices Legislators 
Party affiliation KMT Non-KMT 
Seats & Votes won No. of seats % of seats % of votes No. of seats % of seats % of votes 
1969 8 73 76 3 27 24 
1972 22 79 70 6 21 30 
1975 23 79 78 6 21 22 
1980 41 79 72 11 21 28 
1983 44 83 71 9 27 29 
Offices Taiwan Provincial Assembly members 
Seats & Votes won No. of seats % of seats % of votes No. of seats % of seats % of votes 
1969 15 100 80 0 0 20 
1972 27 75 72 9 25 28 
1980 40 78 66 11 22 34 
Source: Republic of China Yearbook 1990-1991 
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Table 3: Chronology of Taiwan's political development 
Time period Event 
March 29, 1986 The third plenary session of the KMT's 12th Central Committee is held in which 
a consensus on political reforms is reached. 
April 9, 1986 The KMT's Central Standing Committee establishes a 12-member 
subcommittee responsible for studying six major issues: lifting the Emergency 
Decree, allowing the establishment of new political parties, parliamentary 
reform, providing a legal basis for local self-governance, social security, and 
reforming party affairs. 
October 15, 1986 The KMT's; Central Standing Committee decides to give priority to two issues: 
lifting both the Emergency Decree and the ban on the formation of new political 
parties. 
June 23, 1987 The Legislature passes the third reading of the National Security Law. 
July 15, 1987 The Emergency Decree is lifted. 
November 2, 1987 People are officially allowed to visit relatives on the mainland. 
January 1, 1988 Registration for new newspapers commences. 
January 11, 1988 The Legislature passes the third reading of the Law on Assembly and Parades. 
February 3, 1988 The KMT's Central Standing Committee passes the four principles of the 
Regulations on the Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians. 
July 7, 1988 The KMT's 13* National Congress is held, in which five items on the agenda 
are passed including the 'Current Mainland Policy'. 
January 20, 1989 The Legislature passes the third reading of the Law on Civic Organisations. 
January 26, 1989 The Legislature passes the third reading of the amendments to the Election and 
Recall Law arid the Law on the Voluntary Retirement of Senior 
Parliamentarians. 
April 18, 1990 The KMT's Central Standing Committee passes a three-stage plan to 
thoroughly implement the Regulations on the Voluntary Retirement of Senior 
Parliamentarians. 
May 20, 1990 President Lee Teng-hui is sworn in as the ROC's eighth-item president. In his 
inaugural address, he specifies the schedule for political reforms: 1) the Period 
of National Mobilisation for Suppression for the Communist Rebellion shall be 
ended in accordance with the law in shortest possible time; and 2) all issues 
concerning national representative organs, local self-governance, and the 
government system shall be resolved by constitutional amendment with two 
years. 
May 1, 1991 The Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression of the Communist 
Rebellion is ended. 
December 21, 1991 The election for the delegates to the Second National Assembly is held. The 
KMT wins nearly 72% of the votes and 79% of the seats, while the DPP garners 
24% of the votes and nearly 19% of the seats. 
March - May 1992 The National Assembly starts the second round of constitutional revision, 
which stipulates the president is to be elected by universal suffrage. Also, the 
terms of office for the president of the republic and delegates to the National 
Assembly are reduced to four years; the Control Yuan becomes a quasi-judicial 
organ; the National Assembly is empowered to confirm members of the Control 
Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Judicial Yuan who are nominated by the 
president. 
December 19, 1992 The election for the Second Legislative Yuan is held. 
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August 18, 1993 The KMT's 14th National Congress elects President Lee Teng-hui as party 
chairman for a consecutive term. 
December 3, 1994 The elections for Taiwan provincial governor and mayors of Taipei and 
Kaohsiung cities are held. The ruling KMT wins the gubernatorial and 
Kaohsiung mayoral elections, and the DPP, the Taipei mayoral seat. 
August 1995 The second session of the KMT's 14"1 National Congress decides to let party 
representatives determine the party's presidential candidate. Lee Teng-hui is 
nominated to run for the ROC's ninth-term president. Vice chairman Lin Yang-
kang announces that he will run for presidency by obtaining a petition signed 
by the people. 
December 2, 1995 During the election of the Third Legislative Yuan, the KMT wins 85 of the 164 
seats, the DPP 54, the New Party 21, and independent candidates four. This is a 
surprise as it was speculated that none of the parties would obtain a majority of 
the seats. 
March 23, 1996 The first-ever popular election of the president is held. The KMT candidate Lee 
Teng-hui wins the election with 54% of the vote. 
Source: From the reports of China Times, United Daily News and Central Daily News. 
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Table 4: Percentage of votes won by KMT, DPP, and NP candidates in the elections for 
county magistrates, city mayors, National Assembly delegates, and legislators, after the 
formation of the DPP 
Elections Party 
affiliation 
Year\ 
Seat& 
votes won 
1986 1989 1991 1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 
County 
Magistrates 
&city 
mayors*** 
KMT No. of seats 14 14 8 
% of votes 54 48 42 
DPP No. of seats 6 6** 12 
% of votes 38 41 43 
National 
Assembly 
delegates 
KMT No. of seats 48 318 183 
% of votes 68 71 50 
DPP No. of seats 8 75 99 
% of votes 19 24 30 
NP No. of seats 47 
% of votes 14 
Legislators KMT No. of seats 41 73 102* 85 123 
% of votes 69 61 62 46 46 
DPP No. of seats 12 21 50 54 70 
% of votes 22 28 36 33 30 
NP No. of seats 21 11 
% of votes 13 7 
Source: ROC Ministry of the Interior 
* Some KMT legislators renounced their party affiliation and joined with Ju Gau-
jeng of the Social Democratic Party to form the New Party. Since the NP won 7 seats in 
the Second Legislative Yuan, the number of KMT legislators naturally fell. 
** The mayor of Chiayi City, Chang Wen-ying, is not included in the figure for she 
has no party affiliation, but her political view is close to the DPP's. 
*** Except Taipei & Kaohsiung cities. 
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Table 5: Major election results in recent years (% of Votes won) 
Party affiliation \ K M T DPP NP Others 
Elections 
1989 60.10 28.20 11.70 
Legislative Yuan members 
1989 52.67 38.34 8.99 
County Magistrates 
& city mayors 
1989 62.10 25.60 12.20 
Taiwan Provincial Assembly 
members 
1989 69.20 23.40 7.40 
Taipei City councillors 
1989 62.60 21.00 16.40 
Kaohsiung City councillors 
1991 71.17 23.94 4.89 
National Assembly delegates 
1992 61.67 36.09 2.24 
Legislative Yuan members 
1993 47.47 41.03 3.07 8.43 
County Magistrates 
& city mayors 
1994 60.76 29.11 2.53 7.60 
Taiwan Provincial Assembly 
members 
1994 38.46 34.62 21.15 5.77 
Taipei City councillors 
1994 52.27 25.00 4.55 18.18 
Kaohsiung City councillors 
1994 52.05 39.42 7.70 0.83 
Taiwan provincial governor 
1994 25.90 43.70 30.20 
Taipei City mayors 
1994 54.50 39.30 3.50 2.70 
Kaohsiung City mayors 
1995 49.92 35.95 14.04 0.09 
Legislative Yuan members 
1996 49.68 29.85 13.67 6.80 
National Assembly delegates 
1997 42.12 43.32 1.42 13.14 
County Magistrates 
& city mayors 
1998 55.07 18.74 0.90 25.29 
County Municipality mayors, 
Township magistrates 
1998 48.92 15.83 3.09 32.16 
County & city councillors 
1998 51.13 45.91 2.96 
Taipei City mayor 
1998 48.13 48.71 0.81 2.35 
Kaohsiung City mayor 
1998 46.43 29.56 7.06 16.95 
Legislative Yuan members 
Source: ROC Ministry of the Interior 
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